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RECENT DECISIONS
CVIL SERVICE-DISABLED VETERANS-CERTIFICATES

OF VETERANS ADMINISTRA-

TION.-The plaintiffs instituted this proceeding to compel the Civil Service Commission to cancel preferences given to certain allegedly disabled veterans and to return
them to the position on the Civil Service lists which they had as non-disabled veterans. The allegedly disabled veterans had been given preference over non-disabled
veterans on the basis of bare certificates from the Veterans Administration rating
their war-incurred disability at "zero percent." Special Term sustained petitioners.
Upon appeal, held, affirmed on the ground that the Veterans Administration did not
certify to the present existence of the disability and that the rating of "zero percent"
disability, by itself, had no probative force to establish this fact. As the men whose
status is questioned are not parties to the proceeding, however, no ruling is made
concerning whether the order will be binding upon them as individuals. Winternitz
v. Morton, 272 App. Div. 339, 71 N. Y. S. 2d 224 (1st Dep't 1947), aff'd without
opinion, 297 N. Y. 541, 74 N. E. 2d 473 (1947).
In 1929 an amendment to the New York Constitution was passed which provided that any honorably discharged veteran ". . . disabled in the active performance
of duty in any war, to an extent recognized by the United States Veterans' Bureau
. . . and whose disability exists at the time of his or application for such appointment or promotion . . ." shall be entitled to preference regardless of his or her
standing on any list.'
In Potts v. Kaplan,2 the court had before it the question of whether or not disability rated by the Veterans Administration as "zero percent" automatically prohibited the veteran from having a preference. On this point the court stated: "The
purpose of the constitutional amendment and the statute enacted in pursuance of
it does not, according to our interpretation, refer to disabilities which impair their
earning capacity. Rather, as we think, it points towards a reward for one who had,
even in the slightest degree, sustained in war service some physical depreciation
which the Federal Government had recognized as such and whose impaired physique
due to such recognized illness, disease or wound has continued to exist."a Furthermore, the court decided that the certificate of the Veterans Administration was final
as to the fact that the disability was war inflicted and as to the extent to which the
veteran was disabled. On the question as to the present existence of such disability,
however, the Civil Service itself had the final word.
The law thus interpreted was not disturbed until 1945, when Article 5, Section 6,
of the New York Constitution was again amended. The. amendment provided that
veterans disabled ". . . to an extent certified by the United States veterans Administration, and whose disability is certified by the United States veterans administration to be in existence at the time of his or her application for appointment or promotion, shall be entitled to preference. . .. -4 In addition, it provided for a fiveyear preference for all veterans who served in time of war. This amendment, implemented by Section 21 of the Civil Service Law, makes two obvious changes:
first, that the Civil Service no longer has the power to determine whether or not the
1. N. Y. CoNsT. Art. V, § 6.
2. 264 N. Y. 110, 190 N. E. 201 (1934).

A search of the authorities does not reveal
any further cases touching upon this particular subject.
3. Id. at 117, 190 N. E. at 203.
4. N. Y. CONsT. Art. V, § 6.
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disability continues to exist at the time of application for appointment or promotion; second, that all veterans now have preference in obtaining appointment or
promotion in the New York Civil Service.
The principal case decides a rather narrow point. The advancement of certain
allegedly disabled veterans in the Civil Service Commission lists was declared inoperative in theory on the basis that the necessary certificate from the Veterans
Administration stated that the veterans in question had a "zero percent" disability,
but did not indicate that the disability continued to exist at the time of application
for preference. "'The fact that a service connected disability has been evaluated
at 0% disability does not necessarily mean that there are no residuals present.' It
may or may not indicate the continued existence of 'residuals.' ", These bare certificates, therefore, have no probative force to establish that such disability continued
to exist at the time of application. If such a certificate had been implemented by a
statement that the disability continued to exist, then it would have been final and
binding on the Civil Service.
In Barry v. Clapnan, decided on August 25, 1947, the facts were somewhat
similar. The court, however, assumed that the applicants for preference met all the
constitutional provisions precedent to the granting of such preference. It is submitted that this assumption was correctly drawn because the petition did not allege
the absence of any of the necessary certificates from the Veterans Administration.
The sole question is: if applicants for preference have met all qualifications for
preference prescribed by the Civil Service Law, and the Veterans Administration
certifies the disability at "zero percent," must such application be denied as a matter of law? The court found that the "zero percent" disability rating referred to
".. . is merely a rating of impaired earning capacity, and may mean anything from
no impaired earning capacity up to something less than 10% of impaired earning
capacity." 7 The rating has no bearing on the right to preference in the Civil Service.
The instant case is in no way contra to the Barry case. There is nothing in the
former to indicate that a ten percent disability rating is necessary to entitle a veteran to preferential appointment. That case merely holds that a rating of zero
percent, without more, is of no probative force to establish that war incurred disabilities are in existence at the time of application for preference.
This same view is apparently taken by the Federal Civil Service. There, preference will be given to those veterans who ".... have established the present existence
of a service-connected disability and who are receiving compensation, disability retirement benefits, or pensions administered by the Veterans Administration, the War
Department or Navy Department... ."8 It would appear from this quotation that
any veteran who has proved the present existence of a war incurred disability,
whether or not he is entitled to disability compensation, is entitled to preference.
B'oth the principal case and the Barry case, taken together, present a fair picture
of the meaning and application of the 1946 amendment to the New York Constitution discussed above,9 in so far as it applies to disabled veterans who have a rating
of zero percent disability. This amendment contains no qualification whatsoever as
to the degree of disability necessary for preference and follows the decision of
5. 272 App. Div. 339, 341, 71 N. Y. S. 2d 224, 227 (1st Dep't 1947).
6. 189 Mic. 928, 73 N. Y. S. 2d 142 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
7. Id. at 938, 73 N. Y. S. 2d at 153.
8. 58 STAT. 387, 5 U. S. C. A. § 851 (1944).
9. See note 4 supra, and accompanying text.
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Potts v. Kaplan."° The Civil Service can no longer disqualify some veterans by
an interpretation of the word "disabled," for the percent of disability is no longer
of any moment. If the veteran is certified to have "zero percent" disability and
such disability continues to exist at the time of application for preference, the Civil
Service is bound to honor the Veterans Administration's certificate and give such
veteran preference.
While the decisions in these two cases represent a correct interpretation of the law
as it stands today, it is submitted that the 1946 constitutional amendment does not
provide for all that could be desired. It sets up two classes of preference for veterans applying for appointment or promotion. First and greatest preference is given
to disabled veterans. The second class of preference is given to veterans in general
who have served during the actual war period.
Thus, there are two groups of persons who receive preference in the Civil Service,
and yet there is no priority within the individual groups. It would seem that there
should be some scale of preferences so that those with greater disabilities should
receive greater preference, for it does not seem fit that a veteran with a minor disability, which is not even compensable, should have equal preference with one who
has a major disability. It seems equally unjust that a veteran with four years' service should receive no greater preference than one with a few months' service. In
one case, disability is rewarded and in another, service. In neither case is the degree
or extent of disability or service taken into account. This amendment was passed
to reward those who had suffered for or served their country in times of grave
danger, and the intent was laudable. The draftsmen of the amendment and of the
implementing Civil Service Law, however, did not proceed far enough. While they
helped veterans as a group, they did not give any additional preference to these
men, who, due to long service or severe wounds, needed or deserved preference most.
A further constitutional amendment would appear to be in order to provide some
scale whereby long service or severe disability should be rewarded over short service and slight injury.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-TRAL-COMMENT ON FAILURE OF ACCUSED TO TESTIFY.-

During the trial of an indictment for first degree arson, the state's attorney commented upon the defendant's failure to testify. A Vermont statute permits such
comment and allows a jury to draw reasonable inferences from a criminal defendant's silence at the trial. To a charge in conformity with this statute, defendant excepted, contending that in effect the provision compelled an accused to offer
testimony, such compulsion being prohibited by the clause in the Vermont constitution forbidding compulsory self-incrimination. On appeal, held, two justices dissenting, exception overruled on the ground that the Vermont statute in no way contravenes the state constitution. State v. Baker, 53 A. 2d 53 (Vt. 1947).
A state common law rule of the same tenor as that of the statute involved in the
principal case, authorizing the jury to draw an unfavorable inference from defendant's failure to testify' was held not to violate either the "privileges or immunitibs"
or the "due process" clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
10. 264 N. Y. 110, 190 N. E. 201 (1934). See also text accompanying notes 2, 3, and 4,
all supra.

1. See note 10 infra, and accompanying text.
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Constitution. 2 The Court did not pass on the question whether the privilege against

self-incrimination was violated. It was concerned merely with the question whether
such privilege was protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against state interference.
Federal prosecutions are restricted by a legislative prohibition of adverse presumptions against a silent defendant, 3 and judicial interpretation thereof outlawing comment. 4 Most states also forbid jury consideration of a defendant's silence.5
The statutory expressions differ in the several jurisdictions, some providing that a

defendant's silence shall not create a presumption of his guilt,G others that it shall

8
not be the subject of comment,7 and others providing both. In at least two states

any reference whatever to defendant's silence, even if such reference be intended for

the benefit of the defendant, is unlawful.0
It has been held in one state that if a defendant fails to contradict facts tending
to establish his guilt, which if untrue he could have contradicted, such failure may
be commented upon by the court to the jury. 10 The permission here is narrow in
scope"3 and carefully limited in operation.' 2 When a defendant fails to refute certain evidence, 13 which is incriminating and which it is in his power to disprove,
2. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78 (1908).
3. 20 STAT. 30 (1878), 28 U. S. C. § 632 (1940) ; see Mayer v. United States, 2S9 Fed.
216, 217 (C. C. A. 6th 1919).

4. Wilson v. United States, 149 U. S. 60 (1893).
5.
6.
7.
8.

8 WiGmoRE, EVMDNCE § 2272 (3d ed. 1940).
MAss. A,,-\-. LAws c. 233, § 20 (1933); N. Y. CODr Camr. PROC. § 393.
Co-,N. Ga.,. STAT. § 6480 (1930); ID. A,'N. STAT. § 9-1603 (1942).
hr.L. REV. STAT. c. 38, § 734 (1939); N. H. Pu. LAWs c. 336, § 36 (1926).

9. Accused did not testify, and asked the court to instruct the jury that this did not
create any presumption against him. Refusal of such instruction was upheld on appeal as
proper under Wyoming Compiled Statutes § 7507 (1920), which prohibits any reference
to a defendant's silence. Kinney v. State, 36 Wyo. 466, 256 Pac. 1040 (1927). Similar to
the Wyoming statute is that of Oklahoma which reads: "In the trial of all indictments ...
the person charged shall at his own request, but not otherwise, be a competent witness
and his failure to make such request shall not create any presumption against him nor be
mentioned at the trial... !' OLa. STAT. A.,-,. tit. 22, § 701 (1937) (italics supplied).
10. Parker v. State, 61 N. J. L. 308, 39 Ati. 651 (Sup. CL 1898) (common law rule). Although there is no constitutional privilege against self-incrimination in New Jersey, it is
unquestionably a part of the state's common law. See State v. Zdanowicz, 69 N. J. L. 619,
622, 55 Atl. 743, 744 (1903).

11. Parker v. State, supra note 10, at 314, 39 Atl. at 654, where the court says by way
of dictum: "His failure to offer himself as a witness when his testimony could not meet
or disprove any particular fact or circumstance, and could only consist of a general denial
of guilt, probably ought not to affect him, and if so, his silence should not be commented
on or considered."
12. Where defendants failed to deny facts which if true established their guilt, a charge
that the jury might place such importance upon this as they saw fit was error. Defendants'
failure only authorized a presumption that they could not deny those facts, and was not
to be taken as conclusive of their guilt. The charge as given permitted an improper evaluation.
State v. Kisik, 99 N. J. L. 385, 125 At. 239 (1924).
13. Cf. State v. Wines, 65 N. J. L. 31, 46 Atl. 702 (Sup. CL 1900), where, there being
no direct evidence to connect the defendant with the crime, advertence to the accused's failure to introduce evidence to establish an alibi was held error.
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the court may instruct the jury to 14consider such failure in determining whether
or not the uncontested facts are true.
Some additional limited approval of probative effect being given silence is irregularly manifested in a few states. In one jurisdiction it has been held that comment
by the prosecuting attorney did not contravene any state statutory provisions, or
the due process clause of the state constitution. 15 In another state, prior to 1879,
a statute forbade allusion to defendant's silence by either court or prosecuting attorney,' 6 but in that year it was repealed and a new section enacted providing: "The
neglect or refusal of an accused party to testify shall not be commented upon to
the court or jury."' 17 This was defined by the supreme court of that state in 1934
as not prohibiting comment by the court, but only by counsel-the legislative intent
having been to repeal the prohibition so far as comment by the court was concerned,
but to retain it with reference to comment by counsel.' 8
For fifteen years after an accused was afforded the right to testify in his own
behalf, 19 it was held proper in one jurisdiction for a jury to weigh a defendant's
silence, and for the judge to charge them accordingly. 20 In 1879 legislation was
passed providing that "the fact that he [defendant] does not testify in his own
behalf, shall not be taken as evidence of his guilt."' 2 ' This provision was interpreted
to mean that the jury should exclude
entirely from their consideration the fact
22
that the defendant remained silent.
In 1931 the American Bar Association recommended that the prosecution should
be permitted to comment upon a defendant's failure to take the stand, and the jury
to draw reasonable inferences therefrom. 23 At the time only one state authorized
like practice by statute, 24 and the constitutionality of this legislation was yet to be
determined.
Comment by counsel and court, and jury consideration of an accused's silence
14. Frequently New Jersey has been cited as authorizing comment and resulting inferences, with no exposition of the attendant limitations or the caveat in note 11 supra.
Thus, in the principal case the court, citing Parker v. State, 61 N. J. L. 308, 39 Atl. 651
(Sup. Ct. 1898), says: "Yet the failure of a criminal defendant to exercise his statutory
right to testify has been held [in New Jersey] . . . to give rise to an inference against him."
53 A. 2d 53, 59 (Vt. 1947).

15. State v. Ferguson, 226 Iowa 361, 283 N. W. 917 (1939).
16. CowN. GEN. STAT. tit. 20, c. 13, § 7 (1875).
17. CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 6480 (1879) (italics supplied).
18. State v. Heno, 119 Conn. 29, 174 AtI. 181 (1934).
19. One writer has said that Maine was the first state to enact such legislation. Reeder,
Comment Upbn Failure of Accused to Testify, 31 MICH. L. Rxv. 40, 41 (1932).
20. State v. Cleaves, 59 Me. 298 (1871) (early common-law rule).
21. Reeder, supra note 19, at 43.
22. State v. Banks, 78 Me. 490, 7 At. 269 (1886).
23. 56 A. B. A. REP. 137-152 (1931).
24. In 1927, § 4879 of the Revised Code of South Dakota (1919) was amended by
c. 93 of the Session Laws to provide that the failure of a defendant to testify "is hereby
declared to be a proper subject of comment by the prosecuting attorney; provided, however, that if such comment is made by the prosecuting attorney in his closing argument,
without any previous reference thereto having been made in argument either on behalf
of the state or the defendant, the attorney for the defendant may thereafter, If he so
request the court, argue upon such comment for such time as the court shall fix."
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have been allowed in one state since 1912, but by constitutional amendinent. 23 Another state adopted a similar amendment in 1934.20 In New York, where comment
of this nature has long27 been clearly prohibited,28 proposals in the 1938 State
Constitutional Convention for amendment permitting such comment died in committee.2 9 The Vermont statute, constitutionality of which is upheld by the principal
case,30 was enacted in 1935. 31 In the following year, interestingly enough, corresponding South Dakota legislation a2 was declared unconstitutiona 3 3 The Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts, sounded on the question in 1938, wrote that a pending legislative proposal allowing discretionary court instructions with respect to an
3
accused's silence would violate that state's privilege against self-incrimination. '
3
Heavily relied upon by the majority in the principal case, 5 and by authorities
in accord,3 is an observation that the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination arose in our law as a protest against torture, force and the inquisitorial practices prevalent in sixteenth and early seventeenth century England when an accused was compelled to answer under oath all charges made against him.X The
25. Omo Co~sT. Art. I, § 10, amended Sept. 3, 1912.
26. CAL. CONST. Art. I, § 13, amended Nov. 6, 1934, provides that "in any criminal
case, whether the defendant testifies or not, his failure to explain or to deny by his testi-

mony any evidence or facts in the case against him may be commented upon by the court
and by counsel, and may be considered by the court or the jury."
27. See Ruloff v. People, 45 N. Y. 213, 222-23 (1871).
28. Charge that jury could not draw any unfavorable inferences from defendant's
failure to testify, but that they might take most strongly against him circumstances, which
if he were innocent he might have explained, was error. People v. Forte, 277 N. Y. 440,
14 N. E. 2d 783 (1938).
29. The failure in 1938 was the climax to a series of similar attempts in both houses of
the Legislature beginning in 1934.

30. Vermont Acts 1935, No. 52, p. 69, amending Vermont Public Laws § 2383 ,1933) to
provide that "the failure of such person [defendant] to testify may be a matter of comment to the jury and the jury may draw reasonable inferences therefrom," was held not
to contravene Vermont Constitution C. I, Art. X, which provides that "in all prosecutions
for criminal offenses, a person hath a right to be heard by himself and his counsel . . .
nor can be be compelled to give evidence against himself ....

i

31. The United States Attorney General's Conference on Crime recommended to all
state legislatures meeting in 1935 the adoption of "a rule permitting court and counsel to
comment to the jury on the failure of the defendant in a criminal case to testify in his
own behalf." PRoc. ATr', GEN. Cox'. Canm 454 (1934).
32. See note 24 supra.

33. Holding the legislation in contravention of the South Dakota constitution, Art. VI,
§ 9, which provides: "No person shall be compelled in any criminal case to give evidence
against himself. .

. ."

The court wrote that such a provision would compel a defendant

either to take the stand and be subjected to relentless cross-examination, or have the
prosecutor claim before the jury that he was guilty because he remained silent. State v.
Wolfe, 64 S.D. 178, 266 N. W. 116 (1936).
34. In re Opinion of the justices, 300 Mass. 620, 15 N. E. 2d 662 (1938).
35.

53 A. 2d 53, 57-61 (Vt. 1947).

36. See Bruce, The Right to Comment on the Failure of the Defendant to Testify, 31
MicH. L. R.

226-27 (1932).

37. This practice was generally known as the ex officio oath, first appearing by this
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privilege, it is said, was directed against compulsion, not against the coercion to
speak resulting from a defendant's knowledge that unfavorable inferences will be
permitted to be drawn from his silence. The fact that the original evils giving rise
to the privilege no longer obtain does not in itself preclude present applicability.
The privilege as we know it today was initially formulated after the abolition of
the Star Chamber and the ex officio oath in 1641,38 and is well established as one
of our most jealously guarded constitutional rights.3 9
In apparent support of its holding, the court in the principal case points out that
there is a strong tendency for juries to draw unfavorable inferences from a defendant's silence. 40 Conceding this, such untoward practice should not be further encouraged by legislative sanction. Inferences so drawn rest upon the assumption
that silence means guilt; an assumption which might well be false. In many cases
the attorney of an accused may insist upon his client remaining silent because of
the fear that prejudice will arise from exposure of the accused's past criminal record
upon cross-examination, or from his ineptness as a witness because of embarrassment or speech difficulties. 41 In this connection it is significant to note that while
the Model Code of Evidence permits judge and counsel comment along with jury
inferences, 42 it prohibits the introduction of prior commissions or convictions of
crime for the purpose of discrediting a testifying defendant who has introduced no
43
evidence to support his credibility.
Where a statute like that in the principal case permits inferences, an innocent
defendant must either take the stand and subject himself to the strong possibility
of prejudice springing from the factors mentioned above, or remain silent under
his constitutional privilege only to have the jury's inference of his guilt rendered
all the more probable by comment from the court or counsel. It is submitted that
legislation which in effeet presents an innocent defendant with such a dilemma, destroys the substance of his constitutional privilege against compulsory self-incrimi44
nation.
name in 1583. 9 HOLDSWORTH, HIST. ENO. LAW 200 (1926); 8

WIGMORE,

EVIDENCE § 2250

(3d ed. 1940).
38.

39.
40.

§ 2250 (3d ed. 1940).
See McKnight v. United States, 115 Fed. 972, 981 (C. C. A. 6th 1902).
53 A. 2d 53, 60 (Vt. 1947) ; Comment, 37 MICH. L. REv. 777, 779 (1939).
8 WIGCrORE, EVIDENCE

41. The majority in the principal case says that an innocent defendant has nothing
to fear by taking the stand and that "Even in the case of a respondent with mental or
language deficiencies, or with a prior criminal record which may affect his credibility as
a witness, if his counsel will bare these in his direct examination, rather than wait to have
them shown upon cross-examination, the jury will give him fair consideration if his
testimony rings true." 53 A. 2d 53, 59 (Vt. 1947). The weakness of such a position is clear.
Prudent counsel defending an ex-convict in the face of weighty circumstantial evidence
against him would certainly hesitate to have a past criminal record made known to the jury,
regardless of whether it was revealed by him or by the state.
42.

MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, Rule 201 (3)

(1942).

43. Id. Rule 106.
44. See 53 A. 2d 53, 64, 65 (Vt. 1947) (dissenting opinion of Jeffords, J.).
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MmERAL DEPOSITS UNDISCOVERED AT ME Tmir OF CoMMYAIcE.-Plaintiff filed a
bill of interpleader to determine adverse claims to a one-eighth royalty due under
a mineral lease. The grantor of the leased lands, prior to the lease, had stipulated
in his conveyance that: ". . . in the event of any minerals, oil or gas being found
in the bounds of the land we are to share the profits equally." The grantee of the
land subsequently executed the usual mineral lease to plaintiff giving it the right
to explore for and produce oil from the lands and plaintiff in return for this privilege agreed to deliver one-eighth of the oil produced as a royalty. The original
grantor and the assignee of a one-half interest in his reservation, contending that
the reservation was of one-half the oil in place and that they were therefore not
subject to the subsequent lease, filed cross-bills, each claiming a one-half share
of the total oil produced by the plaintiff rather than a one-half interest in the oneeighth royalty. Demurrers to the cross-bills were overruled and plaintiff appeals.
Upon appeal, held, two justices dissenting, judgment reversed upon the ground that
a reservation of profits is not a reservation of an interest in minerals in place. Gulf
Refining Co. v. Stanford, 30 So. 2d 516 (Miss. 1947).
The weight of authority holds that a grant or an exception of "minerals" will
include all inorganic substances which can be taken from the land, and to restrict
the meaning of the term there must be present qualifying words or language to
evidence that something less general was intended by the parties.' The minority or
Pennsylvania rule holds that the term minerals includes only metals and ores and
excludes oil and gas unless an intention to include them is clearly evidenced in
the instrument. 2
The jurisdictions are more widely divided on the possibility of the severance of
the title to minerals from that to the realty in which they are contained. The
minority view, though holding that minerals other than oil and gas may be severed,
refuses to recognize the severance of oil and gas from the realty. These jurisdictions
consider oil and gas, because of their vagrant character, as somewhat in the nature
of animals ferae aturae. Thus they consider them not subject to an absolute but
only to a qualified ownership until reduced to possession. There can be no transfer
of title to them until they are so reduced.3 The majority of the jurisdictions, however, recognize the right of the owner of the land in fee to sever the estate in the
surface from that in all minerals. 4
Where it is held that minerals in place may be severed from the remainder of the
land, such severance can be effected by a proper conveyance. The severance may
1. "Mlinerals" held to include diamonds, Kentucky Diamond Mining & Developing Co.
v. Kentucky Transvaal Diamond Co., 141 Ky. 97, 132 S. W. 397 (1910); gypsum, White
v. Miller, 200 N. Y. 29, 92 N. E. 1065 (1910); oil and gas, Waugh v. Thompson Land &
Coal Co., 103 W. Va. 567, 137 S. E. 895 (1923).

2. In Dunham v. Kirkpatrick, 101 Pa. 36 (1882), there being no evidence that the
parties intended to include oil and gas, the court held that they were not included in
the term minerals. Accord, Preston v. South Penn Oil Co., 23S Pa. 301, 86 Ad. 203 (1913).
3. Frost-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Sailing, 150 La. 756, 91 So. 207 (1920), where it was
held that the owner of land could not convey the ownership of oil and gas because he
had no absolute property in them but only the right to draw them from the soil. See also
Wagner v. Mallory, 169 N. Y. 501, 62 N. E. 584 (1902).
4. Bodcaw Lumber Co. v. Goode, 160 Ark. 48, 254 S. W. 345 (1923); Texas Co. v.
Daugherty, 107 Tex. 226, 176 S. W. 717 (1915).
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be effected either by an exception or a reservation of the minerals contained within
a grant of the realty, or by a mineral deed which is nothing more than a grant of
the minerals apart from the realty. 5
The court in the principal case states that such conflict and confusion exists among
the decisions in other jurisdictions concerning reservations similar to the one before
it, that little help would be gained by resorting to them. The existing conflict is a
result of the application to such reservations of a doctrine descended from the
feudal law and providing, in substance, that the whole beneficial interest in land
consists of the right to take rents and profits, and thus a grant of the profits is a
grant of the land itself.6 This doctrine, first expressed by Coke, has been recognized
by the United States Supreme Court. In Green v. Biddle7 that Court stated: "A
right to land essentially implies a right to the profits accruing from it, since without the latter the former can be of no value. Thus a devise of the profits of land,
or even a grant of them, will pass a right to the land itself."
The application of the doctrine that a grant of the profits is a grant of the land
itself,8 has induced most of the courts before which the matter has been litigated
to construe a reservation of profits as a reservation of a realty interest in the minerals, the grantor thus reserving to himself a portion of the minerals in place. One
of the earliest applications of the doctrine in this country was made in Weakland v.
Cunningluzm,9in which it was held that a clause in the deed, "excepting the profits
from any coal," was a reservation of the corpus of all such minerals in place. This
case was cited as authority in Toothrman v. Courtney'0 where, in determining the
validity of a real estate assessment on a reservation of "all oil rental," it was held
that the reservation of oil rental was to be regarded as a reservation of a real estate
interest consisting of "oil in place" and thus subject to assessment. In the language
of the court: "Though he did not reserve by name the oil in place, or any part of it,
his reservation of all the rental or royalty to be derived from it compels the court
to hold, by construction of the instrument, that it vests in him the title to that
thing, the beneficial use whereof has been reserved, namely, the oil in place." The
court in Vandenbark v. Busiek," one of the more recent cases, considering the word
5. Bodcaw Lumber Co. v. Goode, 160 Ark. 48, 254 S. W. 345, 348 (1923). The court
states: "We are of the opinion that the great weight of authority supports the view that
mineral rights are subject to separation from the surface rights so as to be the subject of
separate sale. What, we think, is the prevailing rule is . . . 'The severance of a mine and
the surface of lands may be accomplished by a conveyance of the mines and minerals, or
by a conveyance of the land with a reservation or exception as to the mines and minerals.
There is no substantial difference between these two methods in the result accomplished;
for a reservation will be construed as an exception where that is the plain intent and
the grantor will retain in himself a fee-simple estate in the portion served.'"
6. Co. Litt. 4b. This general rule has always been in the language of Coke: "If a man
seised of land in fee by his deed granteth to another Profits of these lands, to have and
to hold to him and his heirs . . . the whole land itself does pass. For what is the land
but the Profits thereof."
7. 8 Wheat. 1, 74 (U. S. 1823).
8. See note 6 supra.
9. 3 Sad. 519, 7 Atl. 148 (Pa. 1886).
10. 62 W. Va. 167, 58 S. E. 915, 918 (1907).
11. 126 F. 2d 893 (C. C. A. 7th 1942). Here the federal court in Illinois, in construing
a reservation in conjunction with a subsequent stipulation entered into by the parties to
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"royalty" as synonymous with profits, concluded that the decisions reached by the
Weakland and Toothyn n cases represent the weight of authority.
While the majority of the decisions which have thus far considered the problem
tend therefore to support the position taken by the dissenting justices in the instant
case, it may seriously be questioned whether the application of the Coke doctrine
to the field of oil and gas is either necessary or advisable. In this connection it may
be noted that although those courts applying the doctrine to grants or reservations
of oil cite Green v. Biddle12 as the strongest authority in support thereof, the latter
case did not concern either oil or gas and the court merely commented upon the
existence of the general doctrine. In the Toothman a3 case the language of the court
is notably careful and discriminative in referring to and applying the doctrine. The
court implies that had the application of the doctrine worked an injustice it would
not have been applied. And in the recent case of Rist v. Toole County14 the court
departed so far from the Coke doctrine as to hold that the grant of a royalty negatives an intention to convey part of the mineral title itself and that the word
"royalty" excludes the concept of a fee simple title to minerals in place.
There is much to recommend the position taken by the court in the instant case.
The exploitation of oil and gas present problems quite different from those involved in the attaining of profits from the surface. The expenses of exploring for
and drilling oil and gas are far beyond the reach of the average landowner and it
is well recognized that in the usual and customary practice the owner leases his
land to an oil company which, in return for the privilege of exploitation, pays to
express clearly their intentions in the reservation, concluded that the intention of the parties was to reserve a three-fourths interest in all rents and royalties. Such reservation was
held to be a three-fourths interest in the oil and gas in place. Finding no Illinois decisions
on the subject this federal court turned to the decisions of other courts for guidance. Citing
both the Weakland and Toothnan cases the court stated (at p. 897): "Considering the
deed.., we find that it clearly reserved the three-fourths interest in all rents and royalties both under existing and future leases . . . the reservation of a perpetual interest in
the royalty has the effect of reserving the thing for which the royalty is paid. Hence
by the deed . . . the grantors reserved for their own use and disposition a three-fourths
interest in the oil and gas in place... 2'
12. This was an action to recover lands. The issue was whether the successful claimant
should be liable for the cost of improvements made by the tenant prior to notice of adverse title and whether he might counterclaim against the tenant for rents accrued. The
court, merely commenting on the value of rents and profits, states: "A right to land essentially implies a right to the profits accruing from it since without the latter the former
can be of no value. Thus a devise of the profits of land or even a grant of them will pass
a right to the land itself." 8 Wheat. 1, 74 (U. S. 1823).
13. 62 W. Va. 167, 58 S. E. 915, 918 (1907), where the court states: "Not doubting
the soundness of this legal proposition or its applicability in the construction of deeds, as
well as wills, I unhesitatingly make use of it here, because it will operate justly, fully
effectuating the intention of the parties. The oil was already under lease, and the royalty,
or oil rental, is all it can ever yield to its owner!'
14. 159 P. 2d 340 (Mont. 1945). This court concluded: "...
the grant of royalty
under future leases is inconsistent with an intention to convey part of the mineral title
itself." In reaching this conclusion the court defines the word "royalty" in mining operations as a share of produce or profits from minerals produced and as excluding the concept
of a fee simple title to minerals in place.
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the landowner as a royalty an agreed share of the oil produced. In a field where
profits are traditionally and popularly equated with such royalty the more realistic
approach to the construction of instruments of reservation would seem to be one
which looks to the intention 15 of the parties through the medium of the ordinary
and recognized rules of construction rather than through the slavish application of
a doctrine developed at a time when the complexity of modern oil exploitation
methods could not have been foreseen.

CRIMINAL

LAw-FELONY

MURDER-PROXIMATE

CAUSE-GUILT

OF

FELON

FOR

HoMicimE OF PERSON KILLED BY INTENDED VicTim.-The defendant with several conspirators attempted to rob a filling station. During the attempt the filling station attendant was fatally wounded when caught in the ensuing crossfire between the felon
and the attendant's employer. The court charged the jury in effect that they could
find the defendant guilty of felony murder whether the fatal bullet came from the
employer's gun or a gun fired by one of the defendants. The defendants were found
guilty of murder. Upon appeal, held, judgment affirmed. Commonwealth v. Moyer,
357 Pa. 181, 53 A. 2d 736 (1947).
A felon, who, by his own act, causes the death of another, even though accidentally, during the commission of the felony is generally guilty of murder.' Since intent
to commit the homicide is immaterial to constitute the crime of murder in such
a case, the elements of felony murder are generally confined to the following: the
felony must be independent in its elements of the homicide; 2 the act resulting in
the killing must be done in pursuance of the felony;3 and the homicide must be
4
contemporaneous with the felony.
The principal case, which is one of first impression in Pennsylvania, raises the
question: What is the proximate (i.e., legal 5 ) cause of the death of a person killed
15. The construction and effect of instruments conveying mineral property are generally determined in accordance with the rules applicable to conveyances of real property.
The intention of the parties will be sought and given effect, Post v. Weil, 115 N. Y. 361,
22 N. E. 145 (1889); where ambiguity exists and such contention is not clear, the deed
will be construed against the grantor rather than the grantee, Kentucky Diamond Mining
& Developing Co. v. Kentucky Transvaal Diamond Co., 141 Ky. 97, 132 S. W. 397 (1910).
1. People v. Lytton, 257 N. Y. 310, 178 N. E. 290 (1931) ; Commonwealth v. Lessner,

274 Pa. 108, 118 Atl. 24 (1922).

For a discussion of common law felony murder, see

Perkins, A Re-Examination of Malice Aforethought, 43 YALE L. J. 537, 559 (1934).
2. State v. Fisher, 120 Kan. 226, 243 Pac. 291 (1926); People v. Wagner, 245 N. Y.
143, 156 N. E. 644 (1927).
3. Spies v. People, 122 Ill. 1, 12 N. E. 865 (1887); People v. Giusto, 206 N. Y. 67,
73, 99 N. E. 190, 193 (1912). This principle is frequently applied in cases where there
are conspirators. The homicide must be shown to have resulted from an act committed
in furtherance of the common object or design for which they combined.
4. There is some conflict between various states as to the precise moment at which

the felony is considered terminated. Compare People v. Marwig, 227 N. Y. 382, 125 N. E.
535 (1919), with State v. Williams, 28 Nev. 395, 82 Pac. 353 (1905). 'Compare also
People v. Huter, 184 N. Y. 237, 77 N. E. 6 (1906), with Christian v. State, 71 Tex.
Crim. Rep. 566, 161 S. W. 101 (1913).

5. In the case of torts, conduct is generally considered to be a legal cause of harm
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during the commission of a felony? In a jurisdiction, such as Pennsylvania where
the common law crime of felony murder has been, at least to some extent, codified,
the answer to the foregoing question must eventually be found by a determination
of the common law notion of causation as applied to felony murder. Since it appears that Pennsylvania's statutory definition of felony murder, which provides in
pertinent part that "All murder . . . committed in the perpetration of, or attempt
to perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery, burglary or kidnapping shall be murder ....
is essentially that existing today at common law, 7 the common law principles of
proximate cause should apply in the enforcement of the statute, which appears to
contain nothing indicating a different legislative concept of felony murder.
Causation is essential to all legal liability 8 In tort and crime it must first be
determined if the plaintiff or the victim has an interest which is legally protected
against the particular harm incurred. The former is a private interest while the
latter, public. In Drobier v. Peters9 recovery was denied for injuries negligently
inflicted upon a child before birth, the court ruling that the defendant owed no
duty of care to the unborn child with regard to its bodily welfare. On somewhat
similar reasoning a defendant would be held not criminally responsible for having
caused the death of deceased by breaking her heart.10 However, once the violation of a protected private or public interest has been determined, the act of the defendant, to be actionable or criminal, must be the proximate causel1 of the harm.
to another if such conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm. RxsrATzaraxT, ToRTs § 431 (1934). In regard to independent, intervening acts, if one does an
act which is in normal response to a fear which the actor's negligent conduct is a substantial factor in producing or acts normally to avert such a threatened harm, such act
is not a superseding cause of harm to himself or a third person. See REsTAhTm.;T, Tors
§ 443-45. For a complete discussion of causation, see McLaughlin, Proximate Cause, 39
HARv. L. Rxv. 149 (1925).
6. PA. STAT. A¢NN. tit. 18, § 4701 (1945).

7. For a discussion of the development of the doctrine of felony murder which culminated in the decision of Regina v. Serne, 16 Cox C. C. 311 (1887), see the Law Revision
Commission of the State of New York, in its Communication to the Legisature, N. Y.
LEG. Doc. No. 65, 536-40 (1937). See also note 1 supra.
8. "Causal relation is the universal factor common to all legal liability. On the other
hand, the constituents of the other elements of legal liability change with every type of
action. In assault they are different from what they are in deceit; in contract, different
from what they are in crime. They constitute the universal variants. But causation
is as much an element in an accident as in battery; in a breach of contract as in murder.
And it is exactly the same problem wherever found and is soluble by the same process."
GREEN,,

RATIOzALE OF PRoxm ATE CAUSE 132-33 (1927).

9. 232 N. Y. 220, 133 N. E. 567 (1921).
10. Regina v. Murton, 3 F. & F. 492, 176 Eng. Rep. 221 (1862).
11. The principle of proximate cause applies as much to crime as to tort. "And one
whose wrongful act hastens or accelerates the death of another, or contributes to its
cause, is guilty of homicide, though other causes co-operate. And he is guilty if his act
was the cause of the cause of death; if the relation was causal, and the injured condition
was not merely the occasion upon which another cause intervened not produced by the
first injury, or related to it in any other than a casual way, then the person inflicting the
injury is guilty of homicide." WHARTON, Tm LAW OF HOMCIDE 30-1 (3d ed. 1907).
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To give two examples: in the well-known case of Scott v. Siepard,12 defendant
threw a lighted squib in the midst of a crowd. Each man, in order to protect himself, threw it in a different direction till the plaintiff was ultimately injured. The
court held that the defendant was liable on the principle that he who does the first
wrong is answerable for all foreseeable consequential damages. Similarly, in Keaton
v. State,'3 conspirators attempted to rob a freight car. The fireman, after having
been forced to open the car door, crouched beneath the car, afraid of possible shooting from the rear of the train. The felons ordered him to stand between them and
the rear of the car during the robbery, whereupon he was killed in an interchange
of bullets between the defendants and those attempting to prevent the robbery.
The evidence was not conclusive as to who had fired the fatal shot, but the defendants were found guilty on the ground that since such a homicide was reasonably
foreseeable by the felons, it proceeded naturally from (i.e., was caused by) the
felony and the defendants were accordingly held responsible for the consequential
results of their act.
In a jurisdiction such as New York, where the definition of felony murder:
"The killing of a human being . . . is murder in the first degree, when committed . . . by a person engaged in the commission of, or an attempt to commit a felony, either upon or affectifig the person killed or otherwise .... -14
differs from the common law definition of the crime,'0 it is not surprising to
find the decisions departing from the common law concept of what constitutes
the proximate cause of the death. The New York statute, by its inclusion of all
felonies as the basis of felony murder, appears greatly to have expanded the
common law definition of felony murder.' 6 And yet in another respect the
12. 2 BI. W. 892, 96 Eng. Rep. 525 (1773). In Bloom v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 97
Ind. 478 (1884), an assured person made an attack upon a woman. Her husband, in her
necessary defense, killed the assailant. The court held that the assured person caused Ills
own death. Likewise where one by threats and show of force compels another, acting
reasonably, to leap from a railroad car while it is in rapid motion, the former is crlmlnally chargeable with the consequences. Adams v. People, 109 Il. 444 (1884). See MAY,
LAW OF Camms § 176 (4th ed. 1938).
13. 41 Tex. Crim. Rep. 621, 57 S.W. 1125 (1900).
14. N. Y. PENAL LAW § 1044 (italics supplied). For a complete review of felony murder
statutes, see Arent and MacDonald, The Felony Murder Doctrine and its Application
Under the New York Statutes, 20 CoRN. L. Q. 288, 294-95. Compare WAsir. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 2392 (1932) ; Miss. CODE ANN. § 2215 (1942)' and OKLA. STAT. tit. 21 § 701 (1941),
with MNN. STAT. ANN. § 10070 (Mason 1927) and Wis. STAT. § 340.09 (1943). The above

statutes all contain provisions to the effect that the homicide be committed by the felon
in the course of the felony. Some of the states, however, do not require capital punishment
or life
imprisonment, but limit the offense to third degree murder.
15. See note 7 supra.
16. At common law, as itfinally developed inEngland, responsibility for felony murder
was confined to those felonies dangerous to life. Compare the language of Stephen J. In
Regina v. Serne, 16 Cox C. C. 311, 313 (1887): "I think that, instead of saying that
any act done with intent to commit a felony and which causes death amounts to murder,

it would be reasonable to say that any act known to be dangerous to life, and likely In
itself to cause death done for the purpose of committing a felony which caused death,
should be murder," with the dictum in People v. Enoch, 13 Wend. 159, 174-75 (N. Y.
1834) ". . . as often as the legislature creates new felonies, or raises offenses which
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New York statute seems to limit the common law doctrine of felony murder by
its restrictive wording---"by a person." The New York courts, therefore, appear to
have adopted a strict and narrow application of the common law principles of
causality in interpreting the quoted statute.' 7 This is understandable for two
reasons: (1) the fact that the New York statute, (unlike the Pennsylvania statute),
does not limit the felonies to those imminently dangerous to life would naturally
lend to a stricter interpretation, particularly on the question of causation;18 and
(2) the New York courts, with proper obedience, apply the proximate (i.e, the legal)
cause designated by the legislature, which, in defining the crime of felony murder,
has power to fix, and has fixed, the legal limit of criminal responsibility.10
In People v. Udwin2Po convicts attempted to escape from prison. They acquired
were only misdemeanors at the common law to the grade of felony, a new class of
murders is created by the application of this principle to the case of a killing of
a human being, by a person who is engaged in the perpetration of a newly created felony.
So, on the other hand, when the legislature abolishes an offense which at the common law
was a felony, or reduces it to the grade of a misdemeanor only, the case of an unlawful
killing, by a person engaged in the act which was before a felony, will no longer be
considered to be murder, but manslaughter merely." But see Arent and MacDonald, op. cit.
supra note 14 at 302: ".

.

. the courts may yet hesitate, despite the broad language of

the statute, to apply the rule to non-violent felonies or to acts from which danger to
human life is extremely remote."
17. In People v. Giro, 197 N. Y. 152, 90 N. E. 432 (1910), the deceased was killed
during an attempted burglary when one of the conspirators struggled with one of the
victims of the crime and each managed to possess and fire a pistol at different moments.
The judge charged the jury that, notwithstanding the proof beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendants were confederates, it still rested upon the prosecution to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the deceased had been shot by one of the conspirators. This reasoning prevailed despite New York Penal Law § 21 which provides that the statute be liberally
construed.
18. People v. La Barbera, 159 Misc. 177, 287 N. Y. S. 257 (1936). In this case defendant hired decedent to set fire to certain premises for the fraudulent purpose of obtainig the insurance proceeds. While the decedent was arranging the gasoline and electrical
apparatus, he caused an explosion and was killed. The court held the decedent died through
his own act and consequently that his death was not the result of the act "of another"
and hence did not come within the New York definition of criminal homicide. N. Y. Pk=,%
LAW § 1042. "Homicide is the killing of one human being by the act, procurement or omission of another."
19. See note 17 supra. The phrase "by a person" in the New York statute is apparently declarative of the legislative intent that the chain of causation shall not be traced backward beyond the act of the one who ininediately and directly causes the death. Note that
in the Giro case, the felony was not the immediate or direct cause of the death. According
to the New York courts' interpretation of the legislative intent it was merely the occason.
New York has codified in the Penal Law all the interests which the legislature has considered necessary to be protected. If an interest is violated by a harm not designated as criminal by the legislature, it is not a crime. N. Y. PFNAL LAw § 22.
20. 254 N. Y. 255, 172 N. E. 489 (1930); cf. Commonwealth v. Moore, 121 Ky. 97,
88 S. W. 1085 (1905); Commonwealth v. Campbell, 7 Alien 541 (Mass. 1863). In the
Campbell case it was held that a rioter was not guilty of murder or manslaughter by reason
of the accidental killing of an innocent person by those engaged in suppressing the riot.
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access to the guard room by handcuffing their guards and using them as shields.
Other prison guards released tear gas prompting the handcuffed guards and convicts
to fall to the floor, whereupon several shots were fired and one of the convicts was
killed. The evidence as to who fired the fatal shot was entirely circumstantial. The
jury was charged that in order for them to find the defendants guilty of felony
murder, it had to be established beyond a reasonable doubt that the shot which
killed the inmate was fired by one of the defendants and not by one of the prison
guards. The accused were found guilty and on appeal the conviction was affirmed.
The dissenting opinion, 2 ' although agreeing with the majority that the charge given
was correct, contended that the evidence in the case did not support the jury's finding that the fatal shot was fired by' one of the escaping conspirators.
It would appear from the holdings in the Udwin case and other cases that the
New York Court of Appeals has concluded that in felony murder cases the legislature intended to restrict the acts which may be considered legally cognizable
causes only to those acts of the defendant (or his accomplices) which immediately
and directly cause the death. In a jurisdiction having a felony murder statute similar to that involved in the principal case, 22 it has been held that the robbers of a
bank who forced a teller to accompany them as a shield were guilty of murder
when the teller was accidentally killed by the town marshal. 23 Here the robber's
affirmative act was the direct and immediate cause of the death. It is submitted
that if, in the Udwin case, the person killed had been one of the guards being used
as a shield instead of one of the escaping convicts, the New York courts would have
considered it immaterial whether the fatal shot came from the gun held by the convict or guard. In such a case within the measure of the statute the death would
have been caused by the convict using the guard as a shield and not by the one
firing the shot. The case would be no different from one in which an accused pushes
the victim into a line of rifle fire or into the path of a speeding railroad train. In
such a case the accused could hardly be successful in claiming, even in New York,
that the act of the one firing the shot or of the engineer of the train was an independent, intervening cause which made that actor, rather than the defendant, legally responsible for the death.
It is submitted that in the proper circumstances a defendant in a felony murder
case in New York will be guilty of the death of a person killed by a person other
than the defendant or a conspirator where the act of the defendant is the direct
and immediate cause of the death.
The difference, therefore, between the Pennsylvania and the New York decisions
on what appear to be similar facts, results not from conflicting fundamental theories
of causation in crimes as from the discrepancy in the statutory definitions of felony
murder, particularly as regards identification of the act which shall be considered
the criminal (i.e., the legal) cause.
21. People v. Udwin, 254 N. Y. 255, 266, 172 N. E. 489, 493 (1930).
22. See text accompanying note 6 supra.
23. Wilson v. State, 188 Ark. 846, 68 S. W. 2d 100 (1934); accord, Taylor v. State,
41 Tex. Crim. Rep. 564, 55 S. W. 961 (1900); cf. People v. Payne, 359 Ill. 246, 194 N. E.
539 (1935).
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EQUITY-CANCELLATION OF GIrFTs DUE TO Misrux; LEGrITATE TAx AvomANCE.-The plaintiffs transferred to each of their two children, the defendants, an
interest in a partnership for the purpose of minimizing federal income taxes. The
gift of the partnership interest was disallowed by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue for income tax purposes and the father of the defendants was taxed on the
entire income thereof. Plaintiffs seek to revest in themselves title to the property
so transferred. Held, decree for plaintiffs affirmed. Stone v. Stone, 29 N. W. 2d
271 (Mich. 1947).
The principal case is likely to be one of many similar actions which may be
brought on by the tax authorities' disregard for legal interests and rights recognized
under state law, in the attempt to tax income to its economic owner.1
The plaintiffs' position was essentially that they had been mistaken as to their
legal ability to transfer the right to the income and with it the tax liability attaching
to it, and that since the plan for minimizing the tax imposed on the family income
had failed they were entitled to rescission of the gift. It was contended by the defendants that the transfer constituted completed gifts and were therefore irrevocable
in the absence of a provision to the contrary and that no transaction would be set
aside by equity because of a mistake of law, pure and simple.
In part, therefore, the issue depended upon whether the court would distinguish
between a mistake of law and one of fact and whether it would grant relief in a
case involving the former. The court found the mistake to have been one of law,
not as to the general law of the land, but as to the plaintiffs' own antecedent or
existing legal rights at the time of the transaction.
The law on this particular point in most jurisdictions is difficult of delinition.2 In
many cases the courts have flatly said that a mistake of law is no ground for relief.3
On the other hand some jurisdictions have denied any effect to the distinction.

1. So called "family partnerships" are frequently disallowed on audit by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue since the decisions in Lusthaus v. Commissioner, 327 U. S.
293 (1946), and Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U. S. 280 (1946). Likewise the grantors of
certain trusts, wherein some of the major elements of economic control of corpus or
income have been retained to the grantor in the deed of trust, have been taxed upon the
income accruing to the trustees from the corpus following the decision in Helvering v.
Clifford, 309 U. S. 331 (1940). The interpretation of § 22(a) of the Internal Revenue Code
by both the Treasury Department and the courts has been the source of much comment
in legal periodicals. See, e.g., Eisenstein, The Clifford Regulations, 2 TAx L. REv. 327
(1947); Lynch, The Treasury Interprets the Clifford Case, 15 FORD. L. Ray. 161 (1946);
Miller, Husband and Wife Partnerships,1 TAX L. RE%. 450 (1946). The Supreme Court
of the United States has generally treated tax questions as practical questions. "Taxation
is not so much concerned with the refinements of title as it is with the actual command
over the property taxed . . ." is the way it was put by the Court in Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U. S. 280, 283 (1933), which quotes Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U. S. 376, 378
(1930).
2.

WAasH, EQuiTY 536 (1930).

3. A list of such cases is contained in 5 WmsrLTo, Co.N-macrs § 1582 (rev. ed. 1937).
4. Regio v. Warren, 207 Mass. 525, 527, 93 N. E. 805, 807 (1911). "So it has been
said that the important question was not whether the mistake was one of law or of fact,
but whether the particular mistake was such as a court of equity will correct. . . ." In
this case the court quoted with approval from Renard v. Clink, 91 Mich. 1, 51 N. IV.
692 (1892), upon the authority of which the decree in the principal case was based. See note
10 infra, and accompanying text.
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Legislative enactments have in some states blunted the effect of the distinction.6
Pomeroy distinguishes three types of mistake of law:0 (1) a mistake as to the general law of the land; 7 (2) a mistake as to the legal effect of a transaction into
which a person enters where he correctly apprehends his own legal rights, interests
and relations;s (3) a mistake as to a person's own antecedent or existing legal rights,
interests, duties, liabilities or other relations where he correctly understands the
legal scope of the transaction into which he enters and its legal effect upon his rights
and liabilities. 9 Usually, aside from statute, it is only for the third type of mistake
that a court of equity will grant relief. 10 Essentially the mistake made by plaintiff in the instant action concerned the effect of Section 22(a) of the Internal Revenue Code upon the income gained through the partnership.
In some respects it is hard to distinguish the cases cited by the defendants from
the principal case. Holmes v. Hall" was a case in which the parties were mistaken
as to the legal effect of an instrument and relief such as requested in the principal
case was refused. Martin v. Hamlin1 2 concerned the erroneous belief on the part
of the plaintiff that a recitation in a deed constituted a guaranty. Here again no
relief was granted. Many of these distinctions between types of mistake upon
analysis indicate more a difference in viewpoint than in fact.' 3
Some of the cases in which relief has been granted, while they are cited as falling under the topic mistake, are actually decided on the grounds of hardship, undue
influence or misrepresentation. Walter v. Walter,14 one of the cases cited in the
5. When relief against mistake is sought in an action or proceeding or by way of defense or counterclaim, relief shall not be denied merely because the mistake is one of law
rather than one of fact. N. Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT § 112f. See citation of statutes in 5 WriusTON, CONTRACrS § 1582 (rev. ed. 1937). There is no such statute in Michigan.
6.

3 EQUIrTY JURISPRUDENCE § 842 (5th ed., Symons, 1941).

7. Id. § 843.
8. Id. § 841.
9. Ibid.
10. It was for a mistake of this nature that relief was granted in Cooper v. Phlbbs,
L. R. 2 H. L. 149, 170 (1867), wherein it was said: "But when the word 'jus' is used In
the sense of denoting a private right, that maxim has no application. Private right of
ownership is a matter of fact; it may be the result also of a matter of law. . .

."

The

maxim here spoken of was that no relief will be granted for a mistake of law. See also
Barnett v. Kunkle, 256 Fed. 644 (C. C. A. 8th 1919), aff'd, 254 U. S.620 (1921); Renard
v. Clink, 91 Mich. 1, 51 N. W. 692 (1892). However, money paid under a mistake of
law, with respect to the liability to make payment, with knowledge or means of obtaining
knowledge of liability, cannot generally be recovered. Newburgh Say. Bank v. Town of
Woodbury, 173 N. Y. 55, 65 N. E. 858 (1903). In the last cited decision the court quotes
extensively from Pomeroy and appears to adopt the rule laid down by him.
11. 8 Mich. 65 (1860). The Michigan cases seem to follow Hunt v. Rousnanlere's
Adm'rs, 1 Pet. 1 (U. S. 1828), which laid down the rule that no relief would be granted
for a mistake concerning the legal effect of a power of attorney to sell property. This
mistake would be one of type number two enumerated in the text.
12. 18 Mich. 354 (1869).
13. See WAsn, EQuITY 538 n. 65 (1930), which criticizes the distinction drawn in
Cooper v. Phibbs, L. R. 2 H. L. 149, 170 (1867).
14. 297 Mich. 26, 297 N. W. 58 (1941).
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opinion in the principal case, was an action in which a father sought cancellation

of a note and discharge of a mortgage which he had given to his son when the son
had represented that he had inherited from his mother certain interests in real property actually owned by the father. The father was eighty-five years of age. Moritz
v. Horsiwl5a was a rather peculiar case in which the defendant had received property as a distributee of a decedent under the mistaken belief of all parties that
he was an heir of the decedent. Plaintiffs sought to recover the distribution. The
court allowed recovery on the theory of mistake and hardship to the extent of the

property not yet expended by the defendant. Similar results have been reached in
a number of cases where either the grantors did not understand the instrument, or

where the instruments had been loosely drawn without regard to instructions, or
where people in a fiduciary capacity did not measure up fully to their obligations.10
Improvidence in the creation of a trist has been the basis for rescssion in several
New Jersey cases. 17 In other cases where it is bluntly stated that no relief can be
given for a mistake of law, no relief could have been given for a mistake of fact.' 3
In many of these cases the parties had compromised the issues involved and later
when one of them became aware of the actual status of his rights he either sued
to set aside the compromise agreement or set up a defense of mistake. He has rather
consistently been denied relief.' 9
There is found in some cases the categorical statement that a gift cannot be
revoked on the ground that it was made under a mistake, or that a gift intcr vivos
from parent to child, when fully executed, is irrevocable.20 This is not the position
15. 305 Mich. 627, 9 N. W. 2d 868 (1943).
16. Conkling v. Davies, 14 Abb. N. C. 499 (N. Y. 1878); Dutton v. Thompson, L. R.
23 Ch. D. 278 (1883); Lister v. Hodgson, L. R. 4 Eq. 30 (1867); Meadows v. Mfeadows,
16 Beav. 401, 51 Eng. Rep. 833 (1853). Equity seems especially gallant in aiding young
ladies recently come of age who are persuaded by relatives to turn over control of their
finances to others.
17. Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Parfner, 135 N. J. Eq. 133, 37 A. 2d 675 (Ct. Err.
& App. 1944); Reuther v. Fidelity Union Trust Co., 116 N. J. Eq. 81, 172 At. 386 (Ct.
Err. & App. 1934); Garnsey v. Mundy, 24 N. J. Eq. 243 (Ch. 1873). Contra: James v.
Aller, 68 N. J. Eq. 666, 62 AUt. 427 (Ct. Err. & App. 1905). In the principal case the
partnership arrangement, in light of the subsequent stand taken by the Treasury Department, could easily be called improvident.
18. See R-sTATmxEN-T, R~snruox, REPoRTEns NoTEs § 44 (1937) for citation of
such cases.
19. Dupre v. Thompson, 4 Barb. 279 (N. Y. 1848), afJ'd, 8 Barb. 537 (N. Y. 1850).
See WA sn, EQuiTY 537 (1930).
20. Pickslay v. Starr, 149 N. Y. 432, 44 N. E. 163 (1896). Mthough it is quite possible that the court felt that no real mistake had actually been made in this case, its
language is rather broad: "So, too, if there is an equitable basis for redrcss, by reason of
some mistake of fact in the contract, due to the ignoraiice or forgetfulness of the party,
equity will not infrequently intervene. The principle is, in such cases, that there is not
that consent of the minds which is essential to the perfect agreement. A gift, however,
requires no consideration and depends upon no agreement, but upon the voluntary act of
the donor only, and is accomplished by a delivery of the subject of the gift." Id. at 437,
44 N. E. at 164. Further, in speaking of the intention to make a gift, the court continued:
"... all that we understand, legally or otherwise, by intention, is the design, or determination, of the mind and that mental condition may exist, when an act is done, irrespec-
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of the Michigan courts, however, and it is submitted that it might very well not
be the position of other jurisdictions were it clearly shown that a material mistake
had occurred. In Tuttle v. Doty2 l a gift was revoked on the ground that the grantor
had made a mistake. She had thought that a certain stock certificate had been
stolen and the supposed fact of the theft was recited in the bill of sale wlhich stated
a consideration of love, affection and one dollar. How much this case was affected
by matters of undue influence, etc. (the grantee was a daughter of the plaintiffgrantor), cannot be ascertained from the opinion. In other cases where revocation
was denied there had been not so much a mistake as a change of outlook after the
22
gift.
The holding of the court in the principal case appears to be sound. There are
present the elements of great hardship, of definite mistake whether it be one of
law or fact, and to a limited extent of failure of purpose. It might be argued that
it was unnecessary, in order to effect equity, to revest the partnership interest in the
plaintiffs. On the other hand, however, it appears safer for the court to revoke the
gift as a whole rather than give effect to one which, in the circumstances, the parties
had not contemplated. The defendants were after all mere donees. From the practical viewpoint, the real subject of the gift was the income of the firm; the interest
in the partnership was transferred merely to enable the donor of the income to
donate the income for the legitimate23 purpose of avoiding taxation. The prime
purpose having failed, the merely incidental and secondary gift-the interest in the
partnership-should likewise fail of fulfillment.

MORTGAGES-AFTER ACQUIRED PERSONAL PROPERTY CLAUSE-EFFECT OF, WHERE
NEW OWNER DOES NOT ASSUME MORTGAGE.-This was an action to foreclose a

mortgage which contained the customary after acquired personal property clause, i.e.,
"Together with all fixtures and articles of personal property now or hereafter attached to, or used in connection with, the premises, all of which are covered by
this mortgage." Defendant, who had purchased the premises subject to the mortgage, installed refrigerators, cooking ranges and portable showers which could be
removed simply by pulling electric plugs and disconnecting pipe unions. Judgment
for the plaintiff directing that these articles be sold at the foreclosure sale was
unanimously affirmed by the Appellate Division. Upon further appeal, held, judgment affirmed. General Synod v. Bonac Realty Corp., 297 N. Y. 119, 75 N. E.
2d 841 (1947).
Two fundamental problems of mortgage law are involved in this case, only one of
tive of the fact that, were something else then recalled, it might not have acted in the
same manner." Id. at 437, 44 N. E. at 164; accord, James v. Aller, 68 N. J. Eq. 666, 62 Atl.
427 (Ct. Err. & App. 1905).
21.
22.

203 Mich. 1, 168 N. W. 990 (1918).
Price v. Price, 162 Md. 656, 161 Atl. 2 (1932).

Here a settler fearing litigation

by his second wife transferred property in trust. Afterward he sought revocation, alleging
that he had decided to face any issue which might arise. Relief was denied. Accord, Geddes
v. Congdon, 262 Mass. 294, 159 N. E. 915 (1928).

23. "The legal right of a taxpayer to decrease the amount of what otherwise would be
his taxes, or altogether avoid them, by means which the law permits, cannot be doubted."
Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U. S. 465, 469 (1935).
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which was adverted to and treated by the court. The first, which the court does
discuss, is: Do chattels which are attached to and used in connection with the
premises automatically come under such a mortgage when they are acquired, or is
some further manifestation of the parties' intent to consider them under the lien required? The second question, which was neither discussed nor mentioned, is: Is
the defendant one of the class of persons against whom the provisions of an after
acquired personal property clause' can be asserted?
The Court of Appeals, even before considering the first of the two main questions
set forth above, had to determine whether the articles in question were "fixtures"2
or "articles of personal property . . . attached to, or used in connection with, the
premises" so as to bring them within the literal requirements of the clause. With
little hesitation, the court declared them to be personalty as matter of law, adhering to the rules laid down in Madies v. Beverly Development Corp.3 and Cohen v.
Corp.4 Nor did the court hesitate to hold that the articles were
1165 Fulton Ave.
"attached to"5 and "used in connection with" the premises. The articles in the
instant case were "attached to" the premises within the ordinary meaning of that
term except perhaps for the refrigerators which were connected only by electric
plugs. The court, however, preferred not to rest its decision on that requirement
alone but found, in addition, that they were used in connection with the premises
since well-equipped apartment houses in New York City normally furnish such conveniences. 6
There have been cases 7 in New York holding that the phrase "used in connection
with the premises" added nothing to the mortgage and was a nullity. The cases of
Shelton Holding Corp. v. 150 E. 48th St. Corp.8 and Matter of Downtown A. .0
suggested that where there was an "organic" unity between the realty and the per1. Section 254 of the New York Real Property Law sets out the standard statutory
personal property clause, but makes no reference to subsequently acquired personalty.
2. The term "fixtures" is almost impossible of definition because the cases use the
word in so many different senses. Miller v. Waddingbam, 3 Cal. Unrep. Cas. 375, 25 Pac.
688, 689 (1891); see 17 Woms & PHRAsEs 119 (perm. ed. 1940). When used with reference to mortgagor and mortgagee, vendor and vendee, the term refers to an article which
passes with the land. Milton Friedman, The Scope of Mortgage Liens in New York.,
7 FoRD. L. Rxv. 331 (1938).
3. 251 N. Y. 12, 166 N. E. 787 (1929).
4. 251 N. Y. 24, 166 N. E. 792 (1929).
5. That part of the after acquired clause referring to chattels "attached to" the
premises ordinarily presents no difficulty. Central Chandelier Co. v. Irving Trust Co.,
259 N. Y. 343, 182 N. E. 10 (1932). In Rosenthal v. 269 West 72d St. Corp., 148 lisc.
854, 855, 264 N. Y. Supp. 744 (Sup. Ct. 1933), the court held that refrigerators installed
in an apartment house are embraced within a mortgage containing an after acquired
clause. The court said: "The moment the refrigerators were attached ... title vested....
6. See notes 8 and 9 injra.
7. Ex parte B. P. 0. Elks, 69 F. 2d 816 (C. C. A. 2d 1934); City Bank Farmers
Trust Co. v. Progress Club, 237 App. Div. 812, 260 N. Y. Supp. 990 (1st Dep't 1932).
8. 264 N. Y. 339, 191 N. E. 8 (1934). The court held that kitchenettes were covered
where a mortgagor had agreed to erect a fully equipped apartment hotel.
9. 18 F. Supp. 712 (S. D. N. Y. 1936). A mortgage given to cover a fully equipped
men's athletic club with an after acquired clause was held to cover all the furnishings,
including table ware used in the dining room.
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sonalty, the phrase "used in connection with, etc." would bring the personalty under
the lien. The personal property, according to these cases, has an organic unity with
the realty when it is used in connection with the realty for the purpose or purposes
for which the realty was designed. 10
But even after it had decided that the personal property met the literal requirements of the after acquired clause by applying the organic unity test, the court in
the principal case was faced with what had heretofore been deemed a further essential by the holding in Manufacturers Trust Co. v. Peck-Schwartz Realty Corp."
In that case, in construing an after acquired personal property clause, the court said
that the chattels would not come under the lien even where they met the literal
requirements of the clause, unless they were (1) fixtures as matter of law or (2)
had become part of the realty or (3) that there was an express agreement making
them part of the realty or (4) that it clearly and unequivocally appear that the
intent was to make them part of the security for the loan. The court in that case
found that the movables did not come under any of the first three requirements
and that lacking any agreement other than the after acquired property clause
the intent to make them part of the security was not shown.' 2 This proposition, i.e.,
that the after acquired property clause is insufficient in itself to show an intent
to make the chattels part of the security for the loan, has been recently reiterated
by the Appellate Division.13
The instant case has made a change in the interpretation generally given to the
Peck-Schwartz decision. The court now says that in order to bring the property
within the fourth requirement it is not necessary that there be affirmative evidence
of intent outside the clause itself "in every case." The court has, it would seem,
as between mortgagors and mortgagees at least, distinguished out of existence the
necessity of proving intent and the burden of proof has been shifted to the one
attacking the clause to show absence of intent. The trial judge, with nothing before him but the mortgage clause, was held properly to have ruled that these after
acquired movables came under the lien. It may still be true that the clause is not
per se an indication of such an intent, but as a result of this holding it has become
prima facie evidence of that fact.
With the necessity of affirmatively showing intent apart from the personal property clause removed by the holding in the instant case, in order today to determine
whether the lien of a mortgage containing such a clause covers the chattels in question, it need only be shown in a dispute between a mortgagor and mortgagee, that
they are "fixtures" or personal property "attached to" orl"used in connection with"
the premises as those phrases are interpreted by the Shelton and Downtown A. C.
cases. In the latter case Judge Patterson says, "the clause is given an effect corresponding to the plain sense of the words used."
10. Under this test an interesting question might arise when the realty is used for a
purpose for which it was not designed, e.g., when an office building is converted into
a school.
11.

277 N. Y. 283, 14 N. E. 2d 70 (1938).

12. Id. at 288, 14 N. E. at 72, where the court said: "There was nothing in the written
instruments or in any of the dealings between the parties to indicate that it was the
intent of the parties to include the furnishings of the hotel or the movables in question
within the coverage of the mortgage."
13. Manhattan Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 264 App. Div. 787, 34 N. Y. S. 2d 867
(2d Dep't 1942), aff'd without opinion, 290 N. Y. 550, 47 N. E. 2d 958 (1943).
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We now come to the second question which from the report appears to be involved in the instant case but which was not even mentioned by the court. The
defendant, as grantee of the original mortgagor, purchased the property subject to,
but did not assume the plaintiff's mortgage. The articles of personalty involved
were not placed on the premises by the original mortgagor but by the defendant,
and the precise question is: Does the after acquired clause bind the defendantassignee so as to bring these articles under the lien of the mortgage? If it does,
then apparently this case may be cited as authority for a holding that the after acquired clause is a covenant that runs with the land so as to bind a non-assuming
grantee.
It must be conceded that at law an after acquired personal property clause is invalid because "It is a common learning in the law that a man cannot grant or charge
that which he hath not."'14 In equity, however, such a clause will operate on the
proper subject matter to give a lien as between the parties to the agreement when
the personalty is acquired.35 As a corollary, one who assumes the mortgage, affirmatively undertakes to perform the mortgagor's obligations and, being in the mortgagor's "shoes" in regard to his rights and duties, would be bound.
There has always been a distinction, however, between one who assumes a mortgage and one who purchases merely subject to a mortgage. In Guaranty Trust Co.
v. Queens R. R. 16 Judge Cardozo notes this distinction in construing such an after
acquired property clause when he states: "There is need to distinguish, however,
between the enforcement of the covenant in respect of property thereafter acquired
by the mortgagor itself and property thereafter acquired by a successor or a purchaser. Property thereafter acquired by the mortgagor itself will be subject to the
mortgage.. .. It is otherwise in respect.of purchasers, and even at times successors.
To spread the lien of the mortgage to property acquired by these, there must be
an independent ground of duty. This may have its origin in a statute or in a
covenant of assumption

. . .

or in some other kindred equity."

In the same case, again commenting on the after acquired property clause,
Cardozo, J., states: ".

.

. there is now in this state a settled rule of law that a

covenant to do an affirmative act, "as distinguished from a covenant merely negative in effect, does not run with the land so as to charge the burden of performance
on a subsequent grantee. . . ,,"*In New York Trust Co. v. Buzdll a situation
similar to the one presented in the instant case arose and the court was called upon
to decide whether a non-assuming grantee was bound by the provisions of an after
acquired personal property clause. The court in very clear language held in a
dispute over mechanical refrigerators that the mortgagee's lien did not extend to
property placed upon the premises by the grantee. The court said 19 that the after
acquired property clause in a mortgage is "an affirmative covenant which does not
-run with the land and bind the grantee unless the grantee has assumed the covenant.
. ..Inasmuch as the refrigerators in question were acquired not by the obligors
Kribbs v. Alford, 120 N. Y. 519, 524, 24 N. E. 811, 812 (1890).
15. Ibid. See also Rochester Distilling Co. v. Rasey, 142 N. Y. 570, 579, 37 N. E.

14.

632, 634 (1894).
16. 253 N. Y. 190, 170 N. E. 887 (1930),
(italics supplied).
17. Ibid.
18. 52 N. Y. S. 2d 182 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
19. Id. at 184 (italics supplied).

appeal disnissed, 282 U. S. 803 (1930)
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under the . . . mortgage . . . but by Jacobson and Levine [subsequent owners]
and inasmuch as there is no evidence that the latter or any subsequent owners of
the property assumed the obligations of defendants' . . . mortgage, the defendants
can have no claim to the refrigerators based on that mortgage."
In the oft-cited case of Kribbs v. Alford,20 the same question arose. The New
York Court of Appeals held that since the defendants had not assumed the mortgage the after acquired property clause could not be exerted against personalty
which they themselves had placed on the premises. The court held: 2 ' "The
assignees did not contract that the machinery to be placed upon the property by
them should be subject to the provisions of the mortgage. They did not assume or
agree to pay the mortgage or carry out its provisions. . . .Their acceptance of the
lease bound them to fulfill the covenants running with the land. . . .But it did not,
in addition, burden them with the obligation to make good the personal covenants
given by the lessee to third parties. . . ." With the Kribbs case, therefore, we have
another clear-cut decision that an after acquired personal property clause is a
personal covenant that does not run with the land and that a non-assuming grantee
is not bound by it.
It is evident that if the defendant in the principal case took subject to, but did
not assume the mortgage, the instant case is directly contra to the Kribbs, Guaranty
Trust Co. and Bull cases. We cannot say, however, that these cases are overruled
since the court did not even consider them. 22 It is almost impossible to escape the
conclusion that the lack of discussion on this point and of these cases was due to
an oversight by counsel or by the court. It would appear that these cases are' strong
authority for arriving at a result directly contra to that reached by the Court of
Appeals in the principal case.

RESTRAINT OF TRADE-PRooF REQUIRED UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN AMENDMENT TO THE CLAYTON

AcT.-After hearings, the Federal Trade Commission found

that appellant's price differential system violated the Clayton Act as amended by
the Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act prohibiting differentials which tended to lessen competition and which are not based upon costs of manufacture, sale
or delivery. On appeal from a cease and desist order issued by the Commission, held,
one judge dissenting, order set aside on the ground that there was no substantial
evidence to support the findings of the Commission. The latter did not, as it must,
prove all the elements of price discrimination under the statute, including proof
that the differences in price were not based on the cost of manufacture, sale or
delivery of the product. Morton Salt Co. v. FTC, 162 F. 2d 949 (C. C. A. 7th 1947).
When the FTC has reason to believe that there has been a violation of the Robinson-Patman amendment to the Clayton Act' the Commission has the power to
20.

120 N. Y. 519, 24 N. E. 811 (1890).

21. Id. at 525, 24 N. E. at 812 (italics supplied).
22. In Matter of Schenasi, 277 N. Y. 252, 269, 14 N. E. 2d 58, 64 (1938), Loughran, J.,
said: "Questions which merely lurk in the record, neither brought to the attention
of the court nor ruled upon, are not to be considered as having been so decided as to
constitute precedents."
1. 38 STAT. 730 (1914), as amended, 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U. S. C. § 13 (a)
(1940). The statute provides in part that "It shall be unlawful for any person engaged
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hold hearings and determine the facts. If the evidence warrants, the Commision
may issue to the offending company a cease and desist order forbidding it to con-

tinue its wrongful practices. 2 The Supreme Court in NLRB v. Columbian B. & S.
Co.3 laid down the rule, in respect to a similar statutory provision that the evidence
required to warrant issuance of a cease and desist order must be substantial, ic.,
that as applied in a case such as the principal one, there must be more than the
mere possibility of injury to competition. When the Commission has issued its cease
and desist order the respondent may, under the provisions of the Clayton Act 4
and the Federal Administrative Procedure Act,0 appeal to the federal courts. They,
in turn, may affirm, modify or set aside the order of the Commission; its findings
however, if supported by substantial evidence, of fact, are absolute and binding upon
the courts. 6

The statute7 has uniformly been interpreted to mean that the FTC must prove

that there exists in fact a price discrimination which has, in turn, been held to
mean that it is illegal for a seller subject to this statute to maintain a differential
in price between two parties buying the same product from him under similar conin commerce, in the course of such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate
in price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality . . . where
the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition . . . Provided,
that nothing . . . shall prevent differentials which make only due allowance for differences in the cost of manufacture, sale or delivery. ..
2. 38 STAT. 730 (1914), as amended, 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U. S. C. § 13 (b) (1940).
The statute provides, in so far as is here relevant, that "Upon proof being made, at any
hearing on a complaint under this section, that there has been discrimination in price
or services or facilities furnished, the burden of rebutting the prima-facie case thus made
by showing justification shall be upon the person charged with a violation of this section, and unless justification shall be affirmatively shown, the Commission is authorized
to issue an order terminating the discrimination: Provided, however, that nothing . . .
shall prevent a seller rebutting the prima-fade case thus made by showing that his lower
price or the furnishing of services or facilities to any purchaser or purchasers was made in
good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor, or the services or facilities furnished by a competitor."
3. 306 U. S. 292 (1939); accord, Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U. S. 197,
229-30 (1938), where the Court stated that "Substantial evidence is more than a mere
scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion."
4. 38 STAT. 734 (1914), as amended, 54 STAT. 1235, 15 U. S. C. § 21 (1940).
5. 60 STAT. 243, 5 U. S. C. A. § 1009 (b) (Supp. 1947). The Administrative Procedure
Act is the result of some ten years labor by Government agencies, interested private parties and the courts. It is an attempt to clarify administrative law and it is designed to
afford to parties affected by administrative powers a means of knowing what their rights
are and how they may be protected. By the same token, administrators are provided with
a simple course to follow in making administrative determinations. Also the role of the
federal courts on appeals is clearly defined. Dickinson, Administrative Procedure Act:
Scope and Grounds of Broadened Judicial Review, 33 A. B. A. J. 434 (1947).
6. FTC v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U. S. 67 (1934); accord, FTC v. Pacific States
Paper Trade Ass'n, 273 U. S. 52 (1927).
7. See note 1 supra.
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ditions.8 It is not necessary to prove that the discrimination charged has actually
injured competition; it is sufficient to show that it may injure competitionY The
statute is designed to reach such discriminations "in their incipiency" before the
harm to competition occurs. 10 There has been some doubt, however, as to whether
the burden of proving that the discrimination will injure competition is on the
Commission or whether, after it has shown discrimination, it is then incumbent on
the accused to go forward and show that the discrimination does not have an adverse effect upon competition." Prior to the Robinson-Patman Amendment, the
courts held that the Commission must prove that the discrimination charged tended
to lessen competition.' 2 After the amendment it was held that the language of the
statute indicated that the burden of proof was on the accused and that he must
8
show that the alleged discrimination did not tend to lessen competition.'
In recent years, however, there appears to be a tendency to return to the original
interpretation of the statute. The language of some of the recent Supreme Court
decisions on this point indicates that the Commission must prove the likelihood of
injury to competition. 14 It is submitted that this rule, which has been consistently
urged by legal authors, 15 represents a sounder interpretation of the statute since the
legislature should be taken to have intended that result which is more equitable
and since it is patently easier for the governmental agency to prove the effect of
discrimination upon competition than it is for the accused to disprove it.
The court in the principal case not only requires the Commission to frove all
the component elements of price discrimination, i.e., show that there is a price difference tending to lessen competition, but in this case of quantity price differentials,
even to prove that the differences in price are not related to the cost of manufacture,
sale or delivery of the product. 16 This appears to put the burden of proof entirely
8. General Shale Products Corp. v. Struck Construction Co., 37 F. Supp. 598 (D. C.
Ky. 1941).
9. See note 14 infra.
10. Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U. S. 346 (1921), wherein It
appears that the decision turned upon the Commission's failure affirmatively to prove
that the discrimination had lessened competition.
11. Samuel H. Moss, Inc. v. FTC, 148 F. 2d 378, 379 (C. C. A. 2d 1945). In an Interesting decision a unanimous court held that "Congress adopted the common device In
such cases of shifting the burden of proof to anyone who sets two prices, and who probably knows why he has done so, and what has been the result." The court here was obviously not referring to the true burden of proof but rather to the burden of explanation.
12. See note 10 supra.
13. See note 11 supra.
14. Corn Products Refining Co. v. FTC, 324 U. S. 726 (1945); FTC v. A. E. Staley
Mfg. Co., 324 U. S. 746 (1945). Both of these cases were appeals from cease and desist
orders isstied by the FTC. The main question was whether there was sufficient evidence
for the Commission to declare the petitioners base point system of sales illegal. In each
case the Supreme Court held that there was and upheld the order.
15. See Sawyer, The Commission's Administration of Paragraph2 (a) of the RobinsonPatinan Act: An Appraisal, 8 GEO. WAsH. L. REv. 469 (1940). The author stated that It
was squarely on the Commission to prove the injury to competition as the result of the
alleged price discrimination. See Note, 54 HARv. L. REv. 670 (1941).
16. In the instant case the court said: "The general and all-inclusive legal conclusion
and findings . . . 'That the effect of the discrimination in price, including discounts, re-
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on the Commission in spite of the language of the statute and the purpose of Congress in enacting the Robinson-Patman Amendment.'17
There is strong authority to the effect that the burden of proving that price differences are not related to the manufacture, sale or delivery of the product is on the
accused rather than the Commission.' 8 From a practical standpoint, the Commission should have the burden to prove the tendency of the price differential to lessen
competition, but certainly the costs of manufacture, sale and distribution are
within the peculiar knowledge of the accused. He could readily disprove a false
charge of discrimination in price not based on such cost of manufacture, sale or
delivery.
The significance of the court's decision lies in its expression of a judicial attitude that has recently developed with respect to the powers of administrative agencies. The tendency in the past has been to allow those agencies a liberal interpretation of their respective statutes.19 The principal case and others have strictly
limited the powers of such agencies and have even restricted their use of powers
freely enjoyed in the past.2 0 The probable effect of the decision, if permitted to
stand, will be to make it more difficult for the FTC to prosecute alleged violators of
the Robinson-Patman Amendment to the Clayton Act.

TAXATION-FEDERAL INcomE TAx-DEDUCTION or GAMBLING LOSSES IN DETERNET NcoE.-In determining net income for the purpose of computing
his federal income tax, the petitioner sought to deduct annual gambling losses from
annual gambling gains. The Tax Court disallowed this deduction because petitioner
had failed to show that the losses were sustained in transactions entered into for
profit. On appeal, held, one judge dissenting, judgment reversed. The deduction of
wagering losses is allowed to the extent of wagering gains whether or not the transacMINING

bates and allowances, generally and specifically described herein may be substantially to
lessen competition,' is insufficient. The burden of proving the wrongful discrimination as
defined by Section 2(a) upon the evidence in this case did not shift by reason thereof
under Section 2 (b) of the Act." 162 F. 2d 949, 958 (C. C. A. 7th 1947). The court stated
that the defense of justification (see note 2 supra) only applies to a wrongful and harmful discrimination and that in the case of quantity price differentials unless the Commission proves they are unrelated to reasonable cost allowances "the defense of justification
would not be in order." Id. at 957.
17. See General Shale Products Corp. v. Struck Construction Co., 37 F. Supp. 598,
602 (D. C. Ky. 1941), where the court said: "The report of the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary, which considered this amendment to the Clayton Act stated the purposes
of the bill as follows: 'The bill proposes to amend Section 2 of the Clayton Act, so as
to suppress more effectually discriminations between customers of the same seller not
supported by sound economic differences in their business position or in the cost of serving them."
18. Standard Brands, Inc., 29 F.T.C. 121 (1939), modified May 1, 1940, 30 F.T.C. 1117
(1940). Here the defense was principally cost justification, apparently the only case where
this has been the sole defense. And see 8 GEo. WAsm L. REV. 469, 4S0, 484 (1940).
19. In re Precision Scientific Co., 53 NLRB 860 (1943); NLRB v. New Era
Dye Co., Inc., 118 F. 2d 500 (C. C. A. 3d 1941).
20. NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 157 F. 2d 486 (C. C. A. 8th 1946), 16 FoRD.
L. REv. 135 (1947).
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tions from which they resulted were entered into for profit. Humphrey v. Commissioner, 162 F. 2d 853 (C. C. A. 5th 1947), cert. denied, 92 L. Ed. 78 (1947).
1
The Internal Revenue Code provides for the taxing of net income, which it
2
defines as gross income less certain statutory deductions. If a taxpayer is unable
to avail himself of any of these deductions, his gross income becomes his taxable
4
income.3 The broad definition of gross income has been interpreted to include
5
gambling gains regardless of the legality of the transactions from which they accrued. 6
7
Deductions from gross income are a matter of legislative grace, and prior to 1934
there was no section of the Internal Revenue Code dealing specifically with the
deduction of gambling losses.8 Although some early authority permitted such a
9
deduction if the losses were suffered in a jurisdiction where gambling was lawful,
it soon became firmly established that the deduction was not allowable unless the
taxpayer could show, in addition to the legality of his operations, that the losses
10
were sustained in transactions entered into for profit.
The question of the permissibility of offsetting gambling losses against gambling
gains, as distinguished from deducting such losses from gross income, arose in the
case of James P. McKenna," an early decision of the Board of Tax Appeals. In
1.

INT. REV. CODE § 11.

2. Id. § 21(a).
3. See James P. McKenna, 1 B. T. A. 326, 330 (1925).
4. INT. REv. CODE § 22(a), defining gross income, embraces, inter alia, "gains or profits
and income derived from any source whatever."
S. See note 3 supra. BLACx'S LAw DicnioNARY 835 (3d ed. 1933), in defining "gaming,"
says: "In general, the words 'gaming' and 'gambling,' in statutes, are similar in meaning,
and either one comprehends the idea that, by a bet, by chance, by some exercise of skill,
or by the transpiring of some event unknown until it occurs, something of value Is, as
the conclusion of premises agreed, to be transferred from a loser to a winner, without
which latter element there is no gaming or gambling." But cf. Commissioner v. Covington,
120 F. 2d 768 (C. C. A. 5th 1941), cert. denied, 315 U. S. 822 (1942), where it was held
that contracts for the future purchase and sale of commodities are not "gambling contracts." Such contracts, however, are to be distinguished from financial dealings between
grain speculators and brokers off the regular exchange. The latter transactions have been
held to be gambling. Burke Grain Co. v. Indemnity Co., 94 F. 2d 458 (C. C. A. 8th
1938).
6. Most of the tax cases concerned with wagering income involve the deductibility of
losses, but the taxability of gambling gains, whether legal or illegal, is implicit in many
of the holdings. 'A. L. Voyer, 4 B. T. A. 1192 (1926); James P. McKenna, 1 B. T. A.
326 (1925). See also 1 MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 4.11 (1942).
7. See Deputy v. DuPont, 308 U. S. 488, 493 (1940).
8. See text accompanying note 23 infra.
9. S. M. 2680, 111-2 Cum. BULL. 110 (1924).
10. Citizens & Southern Nat. Bank v. United States, 14 F. Supp. 915 (Ct. Cl. 1936)
(concerning 1931 income); G. C. M. 10873, XI-2 Cum. BULL. 85 (1932). If the taxpayer
could show that the gambling transaction was entered into for profit, the loss was allowable under § 23(e) of the Internal Revenue Code (or like sections of earlier acts) which
provides for the deduction of losses "if incurred in any transaction entered into for
profit. .. ."
11. 1 B. T. A. 326 (1925).
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this case the petitioner, a bookmaker, was allowed to off-set the amount paid out
to bettors from gross receipts in computing his annual gross income. The Board
took the position that such a set-off was necessary in order properly to fix the taxpayer's actual yearly gains. The amounts paid out were not viewed as "losses," the
12
deductibility of which had to be determined, nor were they regarded as expenses.
Rather, the taxpayer's yearly bookmaking operations were considered as one long
transaction, the net monetary result of which was arrived at by setting off amounts
paid out against gross receipts.' 3
Shortly after this decision, the Board, in Mitchell 3L Frey,'4 was presented with a
case in which a taxpayer had listed small gains and large losses resulting from
illegal gambling transactions during two tax years. These losses were sought as
an allowable deduction from gross income for the periods in question on the ground that
they were incurred in transactions entered into for profit.' 0 In its review of the returns,
the Board, holding that the losses were not incurred in profit transactions,10 disallowed the deduction, but, citing the McKenna case in support, also held that
the small gains were not taxable. The theory was that in view of the large losses,
there weren't any actual gains.17 It is interesting to note that the losses allowed
here, as an off-set to the extent of gains, were the result of several varied transactions,1s and so were distinguishable from those in the McKenna case.19
Although in both the McKenna and the Frey cases the Board in effect allowed
an bff-set of gambling losses to the extent of gambling gains without regard to
whether the transactions were entered into for profit or were legal,20 it must not be
12. In Israel Silberman, 44 B. T. A. 600 (1941), the Board held that expenses incurred
in illegal bookmaking (expenditures in connection with the operation of betting booths)
could not be deducted from legal business income. Whether these expenses could be deducted from gambling gains was not decided, as petitioner showed no net gain from his
bookmaking.
13. 1 B. T. A. 326, 333 (1925). The Board says: "...
his system of operations is predicated on a percentage of profit covering a long series of books . . . he does not bet to
win on each book but trusts to his skill in so arranging the series that a percentage of
gain may result. We conclude therefore that the actual gain or profit derived from the
taxpayer's operations in laying wagers on horse racing under his system of handbooks...
is the aggregate of his receipts less the amounts paid out to bettors."
14. 1 B. T. A. 338 (1925).
15. See note 10 supra.
16. 1 B. T. A. 338, 340-41 (1925), the Board says that "a thing incurred is something
that can be legally enforced," and that a "transaction" must be legal in order to come
within the contemplation of the revenue act. It concludes, therefore, that losses from
illegal gambling operations are not "incurred in transactions entered into for profit. '
17. Id. at 341-42, the Board says: "It now remains for us to consider the amount of
losses sustained by the deceased from his gaming. In his returns he asserted that he had
won $900 during the year 1919 and $26,588 during 1920. [These were the years in which
he had reported losses of $26,105 and $64,996 respectively.] As a matter of fact he won
nothing and his reported winnings should be disregarded in computing the tax. . . . In
consequence of his gambling, [he] actually lost $25,205 in 1919 and .1;38,403 in 1920."
18. Id. at 338. The gains and losses arose from betting on races, playing poker and
playing roulette.
19. See note 13 supra, and accompanying text.
20. It has been said that the rule in the Frey case is perhaps one of necessity. It has
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assumed that gambling losses were judicially recognized as deductible to the extent
of gambling gains prior to 1934. More than ten years after the McKenna and Frey
decisions the Board reviewed a case in which the petitioner sought to deduct illegal
gambling losses from legal gambling gains. 21 Applying the law as it was before
1934 (the transactions had taken place in 1929), the Board disallowed the deduction saying: "There is, in our opinion, no greater reason to permit the application
of the losses in illegal gambling
to off-set the gains from legal gambling than there
22
is for their direct deduction."
Since 1934 the Internal Revenue Code has dealt specifically with the deduction
of gambling losses by what is presently Section 23 (h). It provides that "Losses
from wagering transactions shall be allowed only to the extent of the gains from
such transactions."a
Both the majority and the dissent in the principal case agree that this Section
was intended to restrict the deduction of legal gambling losses incurred in transactions which actually were entered into for profit.24 Prior to 1934 such losses were
deductible in full under Section 23(e), 2 5 but now, under the specific wording of
subdivision (h) and the apparent legislative intent in its enactment, 20 these losses
probably are allowed only to the extent of gambling gains. 27 A more interesting and
difficult question is whether this subdivision was also intended to provide for the
deduction of gambling losses, to the extent of gambling gains, regardless of whether
they resulted from profit transactions or whether they were legal. The majority
hold that it was so intended on the ground that wagering losses are now dealt with
separately and were not placed under Section 23(e). 28 One case has held under
been criticized because, in effect, it amounts to allowing a deduction in part of losses
which might be illegal. 1 MERTENS, FEDERAL INcOmE TAXATiON § 4.11 n. 2 (1942).
21. H. S. Anderson, 35 B. T. A. 10 (1936). The losses arose in Florida where gambling
was illegal; the gains in Mexico where gambling was legal.
22. Id. at 11.
23. This same language appeared as § 23(g) in the Revenue Act of 1934, 48 STAT.
689 (1934), and the Revenue Act of 1936, 49 STAT. 1659 (1936).
24. 162 F. 2d 853, 855 (C. C. A. 5th 1947).
25. Francis M. Cronan, 33 B. T. A. 668 (1935) (concerning losses suffered in 1932).
See note 10 supra, and accompanying text.
26. "Existing law [1932 Act] does not limit the deduction of losses from gambling
transactions where such transactions are legal. Under the interpretation of the courts,
illegal gambling losses can only be taken to the extent of the gains on such transactions.
A similar limitation on losses from legalized gambling is provided for in the bill [1934 Act]."
H. R. REP. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1934); SEN. REP. No. 558, 73d Cong., 2d
Ses. 25 (1934).
27. Contra: 1 CCH 1947 FED. TAX REP. ff 200 C-3, in a discussion of the principal
case, states: "Excess of gambling losses over gambling gains, though not deductible under
Sec. 23(h), may be deducted under Sec. 23(e) (2) as from a transaction entered into for
profit by a professional gambler who is dependent upon the success of his gambling ventures for his livelihood."
28. 162 F. 2d 853, 855 (C. C. A. 5th 1947) the court says: "Wagering losses are made
a class to themselves. . . . No longer need it be enquired whether the wagers were illegal
... nor what the state of mind of the taxpayer was as respects his purpose to win a profit.
All wagers are by Par. (h) gathered into a class of their own and dealt with as the paragraph states."
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that a partner's individual wagering losses may be deducted from
subdivision (g)
his share of the partnership's wagering gains,30 but the narrower question of the
deductibility of such losses at all, unless they resulted from legal profit transactions,
3
was not passed on. The language of both the Tax Court ' and the circuit court in
that case indicates that they regarded subdivision (g) as providing for the deduction of wagering losses to the extent of gains,3 2 but neither opinion goes so far as
to say that such a deduction should be allowed regardless of legality or profit
motive.
33
The dissent in the principal case, concurring with the Tax Court, contends that
the only effect of Section 23 (h) is to limit the deduction of losses, and not to
allow them where they were not allowed before.34 This view, although crifcizedP
is certainly not without merit. Under our present law losses by individuals are
deductible only if incurred in a person's trade or business, in profit transactions,
3
or if they result from some uncontrollable event, e.g., fire, storms, theft, etc.3 A
not
be
would
property
taxpayer suffering a loss from the legal sale of personal
permitted to deduct it, and yet, under the majority rule, one suffering an illegal
gambling loss would be allowed a deduction. Such a result seems unsound and
37
unjust
On the other hand, it must be remembered, that although in theory all gambling
losses were not allowed as a deduction from gambling gains before 1934, they were
allowed in fact in the McKenna and Frey cases 38 On this ground it could be argued
that subdivision (h), in so far as it provides for the deduction of losses, is simply
a codification of prior law. Such a contention has some force, but it is submitted
that the Congress never intended to restrict all gambling losses on the one hand,
and provide for the partial deduction of those that were never allowed on the other.
29. See note 23 supra, and accompanying text.
30. Jennings v. Commissioner, 110 F. 2d 945 (C. C. A. Sth 1940), cert. denied, 311
U. S. 704 (1940).
31. Zelda Baker Jennings, P-H 1939 TC fEa. DEc. SERv. ff 39,366 (1939).
32. Jennings v. Commissioner, 110 F. 2d 945, 946 (C. C. A. 5th 1940), the court saying: "If 'individuals carrying on business in partnership' . . . make gains in wagerng
transactions, the share of each is a wagering gain; and when it is entered on his individual return to be taxed, a deduction of his losses in other wagering transactions is
allowed by the statute, [Section 23 (g)] but only to the extent of such gains."
33. Anne P. Humphrey, P-H 1946 TC 1mzr. DEc. SERV. U 46,004 (1946).
34. See 5 MIERTNs, FEDmRAL INcomE TAxAT ON § 28.85 n. 58 (to the same effect).
35. "This decision [principal case) overrules the Tax Court's absurd holding that no
offset for losses is allowed if the taxpayer was gambling primarily for 'sport or recreation."'
RAB=- & JoHsN, FED. LNcorNm Ginr AND EsTATE TMAxArio 151 (1947).
36. INT. RLV. CODE § 23(e).
37.

See 1 MMr=s,

FEDERAL Lcoim TA~xAxio

§ 4.11 n. 2 (1942).

38. Many cases in which the Board or court disallowed the deduction of gambling
losses from gross income indicate that the loss was a net loss, arrived at by prior
offsetting. Beaumont v. Helvering, 73 F. 2d 110 (App. D. C. 1934), cert. denied, 294
U. S.715 (1935) (concerning 1925, 1926 and 1927 income); E. F. Simms, 28 B. 'T.A. 9SS
(1933); M. L. Heide, 2 B. T. A. 451 (1925).
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MINOR

PASSENGERS.-Plaintiff, a boy of six, was with other children discharged from a
school bus across the highway from his home into the custody of a ten-year old
boy, a member of the schoolboy patrol. The latter had allowed one child to cross
but had prevented the others from so doing immediately upon noticing a car was
approaching. The driver of that car, in applying his brakes, skidded across the icy
highway and struck the plaintiff, who had been standing in front of the left front
fender of the bus. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff against both
the driver of the automobile and the owner of the bus. Upon appeal, held, two justices dissenting, judgment affirmed on the ground that the bus driver's negligence
toward plaintiff was a question of fact properly decided by the jury. Vogel v. Stupi,
53 A. 2d 542 (Pa. 1947).
That there exists between a carrier and its passengers a contractual relationship'
from which a duty on the part of the carrier toward the passenger arises is well
established. Its duty consists in the exercise of the highest degree of care for its
passengers' safety, 2 particularly where minor children are concerned.$ Exercising
care includes not only safe transportation to the passenger's destination 4 but also
a discharge of the passenger at a safe place.6 When that place is reached and the
passenger has had adequate time to leave the carrier's premises, its duty toward
him is terminated.0
If a clear concept of what is a "safe place" can be determined, the problem presented by factual situations comparable to that in the instant case will find uniform
and just solution. In Stuckwish v. Hagan Corp.7 a bus driver who saw no traffio
approaching8 discharged an eight-year old girl on the far side of a highway opposite her home. The bus had resumed its motion when the child was struck by an
automobile. The court held as matter of law that there was insufficient evidence
to establish the carrier's negligence. Mississippi City Lines v. Bullock0 presented a
situation where a bus driver allowed a boy of twelve to alight on the gravel shoulder
of a heavily-traveled highway, which he had to cross to reach his destination, while
a car in sight was approaching from the opposite direction. The boy passed rapidly
around the rear of the bus and into the path of the oncoming car. It was held as
matter of law that the boy was discharged in a safe place and, therefore, that the
carrier-passenger relationship had been terminated; the proximate cause of the in1. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. v. Thurlow, 178 Fed. 894 (C. C. A. 8th 1910).
2. Teche Lines v. Keyes, Inc., 187 Misc. 780, 193 So. 620 (1940); Southern Ry. v.
Hussey, 42 F. 2d 70 (C. C. A. 8th 1930).
3. Taylor v. Patterson's Adm'r, 272 Ky. 415, 114 S. W. 2d 488 (1938); Phillips v.
Hardgrove, 161 Wash. 121, 296 Pac. 559 (1931).
4. Palmer v. Delaware & H. Canal Co., 120 N. Y. 170, 24 N. E. 302 (1890); Cline

v. Pittsburg Rys., 226 Pa. 586, 75 Atl. 850 (1910).
5. Vanderbeck v. Chicago, M. St. P. & P. Ry., 210 Iowa 230, 230 N. W. 390 (1930).
6. Choquette v. Key System Transit Co., 118 Cal. App. 643, 5 P. 2d 921 (1932)
Cooke v. Elk Coach Line, 180 Atl. 782 (Del. 1935).
7. 316 Pa. 513, 175 Atl. 381 (1934).

8. The evidence showed that the maximum visibility to a turn in the road in front
of the bus was five hundred and fifty feet. The bus driver's testimony, accepted by the
court, was that he scanned the full five hundred and fifty feet of the road and saw no
car approaching.
9. 194 Miss. 630, 13 So. 2d 34 (1943).
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jury was held to be the boy's own act, an intervening agency. A similar decision
was reached in Greeson v. Davis.' 0 As the driver of a school bus opened the door
to allow a fourteen-year old girl to alight onto the shoulder of a highway opposite
her home, he saw a truck approaching, then about one thousand feet away. The
girl left the bus, walked behind it, ran out into the highway and was struck by
the truck. The court ruled as matter of law that the driver having selected a safe
place to discharge his passenger had fully performed his duty toward her. In
Jordan v. Wiggins," another case involving a fourteen-year old girl, a traction company was held not liable as matter of law for death caused by an oncoming car,
the court saying: "The duty of the bus driver was discharged when she reached the
place of safety he had arranged for her by causing her to alight on the shoulder
of the road, and no duty rested upon him to warn her of the danger of approach12
ing automobiles which in the exercise of ordinary care she could have avoided."
In the Greeson and Jordan cases it was pointed out that it is not the bus driver's
duty to wait for approaching automobiles to stop before discharging passengers, nor is
any duty imposed upon him to warn passengers of "usual dangers of traffic" which in
the passengers' exercise of ordinary care would be avoidable.
It would seem fair to infer from the cases cited that the place chosen to discharge passengers was a "safe place" because there was no reasonably apparent
danger.' 3 It is also clear that when such a place is chosen and passengers are there
discharged, the carrier's duty toward its passengers ceases. The place chosen for
the plaintiff's discharge in the principal case falls within the concept of a 'safe
place" formulated in the foregoing cases. The plaintiff was discharged on the highway six inches from the edge of the concrete beside which there was a three foot
macadam strip. The car approximately one thousand feet away was approaching
from the opposite direction at a speed of about fifty miles per hour. The monitor,
who the evidence disclosed had exercised his duties as well as an adult, restrained
the children, including the plaintiff, from crossing the street when he saw the car.
The driver of the automobile realizing when only two hundred feet away that he
was approaching a school bus applied his brakes, skidded across the icy highway
and struck plaintiff with the rear of his car. It cannot reasonably be said that the
school bus driver should have foreseen the negligence of the automobile driver and
the consequent loss of control of his car.' 4
There is in this case an additional fact which strengthens even further the belief
that the cairier's duty toward its passenger had terminated. The plaintiff was in
the charge of a member of the schoolboy patrol, one chosen by school officials
to care for the other children. When minors are discharged into the custody of
their parents or their parents' representatives the primary duty of care for the
children's safety evolves upon the parents or their representatives.' It would seem,
10.
11.

62 Ga. App. 667, 9 S. E. 2d 690 <1940).
66 Ga. App. 534, 18 S. E. 2d 512 (1942).

12.

Id. at 515.

13. In each case the "safe place" was the side or shoulder of the road, and in three
of the four cases there were approaching automobiles in sight.
14. Rosella v. Paxinos, 110 Cal. App. 299, 294 Pac. 39, 40 (1930): .. . . it is not negligence to fail to anticipate danger which can come only from a violation of law or duty
on the part of another." See also Demjanik v. Kultau, 242 App. Div. 255, 274 N. Y. Supp.
387 (4th Dep't 1934).
15. Schneidau v. New Orleans & C. Ry., 48 La. Ann. 866, 19 So. 918 (1896).

In
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therefore, that discharging a minor in what was apparently a safe place and, furthermore, discharging him into the custody of his parents' representative was, if
anything, more than the carrier was obliged to do.
The rule established by the cases mentioned and adopted by the dissenting justices in the principal case would seem to have been disregarded by the majority
of the court which in effect extends the liability of a carrier to that of an insurer. 10
The carrier's duty, as matter of law, should be deemed to have been terminated
when the carrier discharged its passenger in a safe place.

OF PLAINTIFF'S QUESTIONING
CASES.-Action to recover damages for
personal injuries sustained when the automobile driven by plaintiff collided with
one owned by the defendant. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff. The defendant appealed on the ground that the plaintiff was permitted to ask improper
questions concerning insurance'in the examination of the jurors on their voir dire.
Held, two justices dissenting, judgment reversed. Wheeler v. Rudek, 397 Ill. 438,
74 N. E. 2d 601 (1947).
The general rule undoubtedly' is that in a personal injury action the plaintiff's
attorney may interrogate the prospective jurors on their voir dire with reference to
their own or their relatives' interest in or connection with insurance companies.' This
rule is based on the fundamental principle that both litigants have an equal right
to a disinterested, impartial jury. Insurance companies with their vast holdings
have numerous citizens financially interested in their operations, 2 thus creating
a right in the plaintiff to protect himself from such persons sitting in judgment on
issues which would affect the finances of the insurance company involved. Som
courts have expressed the view that the plaintiff's counsel has not only the right
but the duty to protect his client from such possible prejudice.3
The rights of the defendant are also to be presented. He, too, is entitled to a disinterested, impartial jury. In this connection it is maintained that there is a tendency prevalent among jurors more readily to award damages to a plaintiff in cases where
they have knowledge that an insurance company and not the individual defendant will
TRIAL-JURY

VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION-EFFECT

RE INSURANCE IN AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT

cases where the minor passenger and parent or guardian are still in transit, however, although the presumption arises that the duty of care of the children is upon the parent or
guardian, the carrier still has a duty to use reasonable care where it sees or should see
that the children are in danger. See St. Louis I. M. & S. Ry. v. Reproad, 59 Ark. 180,
26 S. W. 1037, 1038 (1894); Longacre v. Yonkers R. R., 236 N. Y. 119, 124, 140 N. E.
215, 217 (1923), modifying 202 App. Div. 845, 194 N. Y. Supp. 952 (2d Dep't 1922).

16. It is well settled that a carrier is not an insurer of the safety of its passengers.
Weiner v. May Dep't Stores, 35 F. Supp. 895 (S. D. Cal. 1940).
1. Levens v. Stocco, 5 Cal. App. 2d 693, 43 P. 2d 357 (1935); Bauer v. Reavell, 219
Iowa 1212, 260 N. W. 39 (1935) ; Stalcup v. Ruzic, 185 P. 2d 298 (N. M. 1947).

2. Shareholders, stockholders, directors, officers, employees, agents and others.
3. Smithers v. Henriquez 368 Il1. 588, 15 N. E. 2d 499, 501 (1938). "Under his duty
as a lawyer and to his client, plaintiff's counsel was required to exercise all lawful means
known to him to see that no interested party sat as a juror in the case." Similar language
was used by a court in a prior case, Rinklin v. Acker, 125 App. Div. 244, 249, 109 N. Y.
Supp. 125, 129 (2d Dep't 1908).
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bear the loss. 4 This has caused the courts to limit the right of the plaintiff's counsel in his interrogation of the jurors concerning insurance to instances where he
evidences good faith in his questioning. 5 This limitation is for most purposes based
upon a rationale which has been rendered obsolete by the expansion of the coverage of liability insurance. In recent years the insurance companies have made use
of such extensive advertising with respect to the merits of owning insurance that
today it is common knowledge that the vast majority of automobile owners carry
insurance and that in the trial of cases the defense is usually conducted by the
insurer. As a practical matter, there is very little, if any, chance that defendant's
being insured would or could be kept from the jury. In Rin.lint v. AckerO this was
pointed out as follows: ". . . the same is true of the notion that if such questions
[insurance connections or interests of jurymen on voir dire examination] were not
asked the jurymen would never know during the trial that the defendant was so insured. It must be humiliating to jurymen to learn that such a low estimate of their
intelligence and alertness is entertained anywhere, let alone by the judges who review their verdicts on appeal. Every trial judge knows instantly whether the defendant is insured; and I know of no trial judge who is under the vain conceit that
while he knows his jurymen do not."
The connotations* involved in the phrase "in good faith" present the crux of the
entire problem. When, in what manner, and to what degree plaintiff's counsel can
refer to insurance on the voir dire examination without impairing the defendant's
right to have his insurance policy concealed from the jurors is the issue to be decided in each case. Determinations have not been uniform. In Hoge v. Soiss=7s'
it was held that a continual repetition of questions, apparently to individual jurors,
with respect to any connection he might have with a named insurer, or any possible indirect connection of his company with it, was regarded as at least questionable. A general question to the jurors as to whether any of them were employed
by or interested in any insurance company whose business it was to insure automobiles against the personal injury of the owner was in the same case upheld as
asked in good faith. Hoagland v. Dolans held that it was not improper to place before the jury the information that defendant was insured and that such damages
as might be allowed to plaintiff (suing for personal injuries) would be paid by some
insurance company. In Stalcup v. Ruzic9 the plaintiff's counsel asked each prospective juror two questions which concerned his interest in or connection with particular
insurance companies, and two questions which pertained to his family's interest
in or connection with the same companies. Each of the questions was thereafter
asked of the jury collectively. This was held to be within the bounds of good faith.
4. See, e.g., note 6 supra.
5. See note 1 supra.
6. 125 App. Div. 244, 249, 109 N. Y. Supp. 125, 129 (2d Dep't 190S). The opinion
goes on to express its view on the subject in another regard, "And the notion that our
jurymen are so lawless or weak or corrupt that if they find out that the defendant is
insured against damages for accidents they will render a verdict against him, when they
would not have done so if that fact had been kept from them, is so false and so unjust
to them that it should not be dignified by discussion. It never arose in the mind of any
lawyer or judge who had a considerable or fair experience in the trial courts."
7. 48 Ohio App. 221, 192 N. E. 860 (1933).
8. 259 Ky. 1, 81 S. W. 2d 869 (1935).
9. 185 P. 2d 298 (N. M. 1947).
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Great discretion is given the trial judge in determining the good faith of the
plaintiff's counsel, and it is further held that the trial judge's discretion will not be
disturbed unless there has been an abuse thereof. 10 It might be noted, however,
that since the discretion of each trial judge is not confined within definite limits
any particular exercise of the discretion is apt to be called an abuse-L-or a correct
exercise-on appeal. Decisions noted above are the result."
In New York an attempt has been made to solve the problem by a statute 12 which
provides in substance that an inquiry of a prospective juror's connections with or
interest in insurance companies is pertinent and proper and should not be excluded
simply because it might permit the jury to infer that the defendant is insured. There
is no mention of good faith in the statute and certain questions concerning the insurance connections of the prospective jurors have been sanctioned regardless of
the motives of counsel. 13
Smithers v. Henriquez14 is the leading Illinois case on this subject. Therein the
court analyzed the law relative to interrogation as regards insurance on the voir dire
examination, and laid down the rule that the plaintiff could show good faith by
filing an affidavit in which it would be alleged on information and belief that the defendant was insured, that the insurance company was conducting the defendant's
case, that the insurance company had offices in the county and that there was a
reasonable possibility that one of the prospective jurors had some interest in or
connection with the insurance company. A preliminary hearing would then be
held outside the presence of the jury and the trial judge would either permit or
forbid the interrogation of the jurors on insurance. This case was followed by
Edwards v. Hill-Thomas Lime & Cement Co.'ri wherein the plaintiff filed no preliminary affidavit and a question was asked of the jury relative to their insurance
affiliations. The court, while reversing a judgment for the plaintiff on the ground
that the question was asked in bad faith, stated: "While there is nothing in the
record to show the request for question was not made in good faith, the record is
equally barren of any fact to show that it was so made."'1 The court in another
case, Kavanaugh v. Parret,'7 ruled that the plaintiff showed bad faith in the questioning, though an affidavit had been filed. A strong dissent contended that the
decision was, in effect, overruling the Smithers case. In the more recent case of
Moore v. Edmonds18 the affidavit was filed and certain questions asked with reference to insurance. The court affirmed a judgment for plaintiff and reaffirmed the
principles announced in the Smithers case. In the instant case the plaintiff filed the
10. Some courts append two conditions to the overruling of the trial judge's decision.
These are: (1) the amount of damages awarded by the jury must not be disproportionate to that which the evidence reasonably justifies; and (2) the defendant's liability under
the evidence must not be a close question. Stalcup v. Ruzic, 185 P. 2d 298, 301 (N. M.
1947).
11. See cases cited in notes 7, 8 and 9 supra.
12. N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 452.
13. Odell v. Genesee Construction Co., 145 App. Div. 125, 129 N. Y. Supp. 122 (4th
Dep't 1911).
14. 368 Ill. 588, 15 N. E. 2d 499 (1938).
15. 378 Ill.
180, 37 N. E. 2d 801 (1941).
16. Id. at 185, 37 N. E. 2d at 803.
17. 379 Ill. 273, 40 N. E. 2d 500 (1942).
18. 384 Ill.
535, 52 N. E. 2d 216 (1943).
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affidavit and asked questions on voir dire which were closely parallel to those asked
in the Moore case. The court, however, distinguished the two cases by indicating
that in the Moore case the defendant's counsel had acquiesced in the procedure that
led to the questioning. This distinction would seem to be ill-founded, however, as
the court's opinion in the Moore case made no mention of such acquiescence as a
material factor in their decision.10
The court in the principal case based its reversal on the ground that the affidavit
was insufficient as a proper attestation of good faith. "In the quoted part of the
affidavit it is said affiant has 'reasonable grounds for believing' that persons who are
interested in the company may be among the panel of jurors called into the jury
box. Affiant did not set forth what her reasonable grounds were and without them
the court had no 'ay of determining whether she was justified in her belief that
persons interested in the insurance company would be called into the jury box."2 0
This basis destroys the efficacy of the affidavit and negatives one of the fundamental principles set down in the Smithers case, i.e., "It is a well-known fact that there
are numerous liability insurance companies with offices and widespread business
connections in the city of Chicago. How plaintiff could be expected to obtain information as to any affiliation of prospective jurors with the interested insurance company before knowing what jurors would be called into the box is not suggested. In
any case, to say that as a basis for such inquiry, litigants must, before the trial,
examine the jury list and investigate and determine the qualifications of prospective jurors, would impose an onerous and unreasonable task upon them, and, in
effect, nullify the statutory provision and time-honored custom of examining the
jurors upon the trial. The affidavit made a sufficient shov.ing to warrant the granting of a proper inquiry."2 1 The requirement that the plaintiff investigate each prospective juror before the examination would, if fully carried out in each case, completely nullify the theory underlying a voir dire examination.
It is suggested that the correct procedure in respect to insurance in voir dire
examinations should be standardized somewhat as follows: 22 1. An affidavit should
be filed in which affiant should allege the same matter required by the Smithers
case. This affidavit will serve as an objective standard for the plaintiff's "good
19. This point was brought out solely by the concurring opinion in the Moore case.
20. 397 "ll.438, 445, 74 N. E. 2d 601, 604-05 (1947).
21. Smithers v. Henriquez, 368 Ill. 588, 591, 15 N. E. 2d 499, 501 (1938).
22. The court in Avery v. Collins, 171 liss. 636, 157 So. 695, 699 (1935), gave the
following procedure as the correct guide: The plaintiff's counsel may ask of each prospective juror the nature of his business, and if, for example, the latter states that his business
is that of a farmer, the next question would be to ask whether he has any other business
connections. If the answer to this is "No," the Mississippi court would end the privilege.
The court, however, goes on to say: "There may be cases, nevertheless, wherein it will
happen that there will be no reasonable method of getting at the question of the juror's
qualification on the issue of his insurance connections except by interrogatories which will
disclose that the defendant in the particular case is probably insured, but the trial judge
should see to it that the necessity exists in the particular case, and, when such interrogatories are put to a juror, the trial judge in the plain interest of fair trials must, upon
request of the defendant admonish the jury that the matter of insurance shall have
nothing to do with the decision of the case either upon the issue of liability or upon the
amount of damages." Quoted as correct procedure in Stalcup v. Ruzic, 185 P. 2d 298, 301
(N. M. 1947) (dissenting opinion).
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faith," and the mere fact that he cannot show reasonable grounds for his belief
that a prospective juror might be an interested party should not bar his interrogation
of the jurors concerning insurance. 2. When the trial judge has passed on the sufficiency of the affidavit, plaintiffs counsel should be allowed to ask standard questions
of the prospective jurors in the presence of the trial judge. 3. The exercise of the
trial judge's discretion, although concededly cut to the minimum by this procedure,
should be most strongly upheld in fact rather than in theory only by the appellate
courts.
The standardized procedure will eliminate the perplexing problem of determining
the "good faith" of the plaintiff, and will go far toward settling the law on the
subject. No longer will a plaintiff complete his case and obtain a judgment only
to have his case reversed on appeal because he had relied on afid followed rules of
procedure theretofore sanctioned by the courts of that state.

UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION-THE MEANING OF THE TERM "AVAILABLE FOR
WORK."-The plaintiff had lived in Kansas City, Missouri, for thirteen years during
which time she had been employed as a skilled clerical worker in a large office.
Plaintff's husband, for business reasons, moved to a farm which he owned near a
small town. The plaintiff voluntarily left her job to live with her husband in the
town which was beyond commuting distance from Kansas City. She registered for
employment as a clerical worker and applied for unemployment compensation. At
the time some clerical work was performed in the local courthouse but no vacancies
existed. The unemployment commission declared that the plaintiff was not eligible
for compensation because she was not "available for work" under the terms of the
Missouri statute. A lower court had reversed that ruling, and from that reversal
the commission appealed. Held, judgment reversed upon the ground that there was
some evidence to support the commission's finding. Wiley v. Carroll, 201 S. W. 2d
320 (Mo. 1947).
The court in the principal case was faced with two separate and distinct issues:
first, whether the plaintiff left her job for "good cause"; second, whether she was
"available for work" when she applied for compensation. At the outset it might
be well to bear in mind that this legislation has presented entirely new problems
to the courts and it is not surprising to find in the cases an absence of uniformity
of well established legal principles.'
"Good cause" is the expression used to describe the conditions under which the
claimant must have left his last job in order to be eligible for unemployment compensation.2 If there was no valid reason for leaving his employment the claimant
is not entitled to compensation. The requirements of "good cause" and "availability
for work" are usually defined explicitly by statute. The latter requirement refers
to the conditions the claimant must satisfy at the time he applies for compensation.8
1. Bliley Elec. Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 158 Pa. Super. 548, 45 A. 2d
898, 901 (1946).
2. Mo. REv. STAT. § 9431a (1939): "An individual shall be disqualified for benefits
.for the week in which he has left work without good cause ...."
3. Id. § 9430c (1943): "An unemployed individual shall be eligible for benefits with
respect to any week only if the commission finds that . . .he is able to work and is
available for work. ..."
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Thus, if a worker leaves his job because of poor health it may be ruled that he left

for "good cause," but if he is still sick when he applies for compensation he will
4
be ineligible because he-is not "available for work."
The courf in the principal case apparently did not distinguish between "good

cause" and "availability for work"* since it treated the circumstance that plaintiff
voluntarily left her job and her "availability for work" as one and the same question,6 basing its ruling explicitly on that section of the Missouri la. ,7 which relates
to "availability for work."
Claimants were adjudged not "available for work" and consequently were refused
compensation in the following instances when the claimant: was out of work because of a strike; 8 could not work because of poor health;0 refused several offers
of employment which claimant was able to perform;10 could not work because he
was a full time student;' was a seasonal worker who refused to find any kind of
off-season job;' 2 insisted on getting a type of employment for which claimant was
not trained.' 3 There is little conflict in holding these claimants unavailable for
work since it follows logically that unemployment compensation is intended only
for those persons who are employable and who want employment but, because of
economic conditions, cannot find work.
The cases referred to above, though involtng factual situations readily distinguishable from the one in the principal case, nevertheless, serve to clarify the phrase,
"available for work." In all of them the claimant's "availability for work" was determined by the individual's willingness, capacity and ability to work, but the instant
case appears to introduce a new element into the test, i.e., "reasonable prospect of
employment."' 4 It appears that claimants' "availability for work" is measured in
terms of the "availability of work." Compensation is being denied the claimant
because of the unavailability of work.
In Reger v. Administrator'5 another court, in applying a Connecticut statutel a
4. See note 9 infra.
S. See notes 2 and 3 supra.
6. 201 S. W. 2d 320, 322 (Mo. 1947): "...
whatever the purpose of Unemployment
Compensation Law . . . it is certain that it was not intended that its benefits should
be extended to one who not only voluntarily and because of personal affairs quit her employment but in addition moved into a community in which there was no reasonable prospect of employment. . .
7. See note 3 supra.
8. Board of Review v. Mid-Continent Petroleum, 193 Okla. 36, 141 P. 2d 69 (1943).
9. DYantone v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 159 Pa. Super. 15, 46 A. 2d 525
(1946).
10. Welch v. Review Bd. of Employment Security Division of Indiana, 115 Ind. App.
230, 58 N. E. 2d 363 (1944). The claimant said he was not interested in work in the
state of Indiana and refused to accept several offers of suitable work.
11. Keen v. Texas Unemployment Comp. Commission, 148 S. W. 2d 211 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1941).
12. In re Leshner, 268 App Div. 582, 52 N. Y. S. 2d 587 (3d Dep't 1944).
13. Donnelly Garment Co. v. Keitel, 354 Mo. 1138, 193 S. W. 2d 577 (1946).
14. See note 6 supra.
15. 132 Conn. 647, 46 A. 2d 844 (1946).
16. CoN-. GmN. STAT. § 1339e (2) (Supp. 1939): "An unemployed individual shall be
eligible to receive benefits with respect to any week only if he shall have been found ...
physically and mentally able to work and.. . 'available for work'....1"
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to facts essentially similar to those in the instant case, has reached an opposite
conclusion. The plaintiff was employed for about a year as a bookkeeper in
New Haven, Connecticut. In January, 1944, she left her job and went to live
in a small town near the army camp in which her husband was stationed. When
plaintiff failed to get a clerical job she applied for unemployment compensation. The claim was refused on the ground that she was not "available for
work" when she left her job in order to relocate in a place where she could
not reasonably expect to obtain suitable work. On appeal, however, it was held that
she was "available for work" and entitled to compensation. The court defined availability in these words: "The availability requirement is said to be satisfied when an
individual is willing, able and ready to accept suitable work which he does not have
good cause to refuse, that is, when he is genuinely attached to the labor market."' 17
This definition differs radically from that laid down in the instant case. The Connecticut court reasons that if we are to test the availability of the individual claimant,
the labor market' s must be described in terms of the individual. In such terms a
labor market exists when the type of work which the claimant is capable of doing
is performed in the community in which he is able to work.19 In short, the test
laid down by the Connecticut court is subjective as compared to the objective test
employed in the instant case. The rationale which supports the decision in the
Connecticut case is based on the finding that a labor market did exist for work
done by the plaintiff. It is not material, the court explained; that the plaintiff has
or has not a reasonable prospect of employment. Since a labor market did exist
for the plaintiff's services she was held to be "available for work" and' eligible for
compensation. 20 The Connecticut court does not stand alone in rejecting the
"reasonable prospect of employment" test of availability.2 '
It is submitted that the subjective test of "availability for work" is better supported by reason than the objective test applied in the principal case. It might be
argued by the supporters of the latter test that the adoption of the subjective test
will exhaust the insurance fund,22 but this does not appear to be a sound basis upon
which to decide cases of this type. The unemployment compensation law is de17.
18.

Reger v. Administrator, 132 Conn. 647, 46 A. 2d 844, 845 (Conn. 1946).
FuNK & WACNALLs NEW STANDARD DICTIONARY defines labor market as "the

opportunity for finding employment or for hiring workmen; the relative demand for
and supply of labor."
19. The opinion in the Reger case cites employment figures which indicate that less
than three percent of all work in that area was clerical work. This indicates that a
"labor market" does not require a large percentage of the total work which is being done.
20.

Ibid.

21. Bliley Elec. Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 158 Pa. Super. 548, 45 A.
2d 898 (1946). This case again concerns a wife who left her job to join her husband
in the Army. No employer would hire her because she was only a temporary resident.
The court held that she was "available for work." The question appears to be unsettled in New York. See Smith v. Murphy, 267 App. Div. 468, 470, 46 N. Y. S. 2d 774,
775 (3d Dep't 1944). Contra: Salvarria v. Murphy, 266 App. Div. 933, 43 N. Y. S. 2d
899 (3d Dep't 1942).

22. Cf., however, the fact that the insurance fund in. New York is so large
($1,065,000,000) that the legislature has passed a bill limiting the size of the fund to nine
hundred million dollars and returning one hundred and sixty-five million to state business firms. N. Y. Post, March 4, 1948, p. 5, col. 1.
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scribed as remedial, humanitarian legislation, which must be broadly and liberally
construed if it is to serve its purpose.m This means a "construction in the interests
of those whose rights are th be protected ...by which the letter of the statute
is enlarged or restrained so as more effectually to accomplish the purpose intended."2 4
If the statute is construed in favor of the persons for whose benefit it was intended, it follows logically that a claimant to be disqualified for compensation, must
be explicitly disqualified by the provisions of the statute.2 The plaintiff in the principal case was not so disqualified, but the court, by apparently refusing to give the
statute a liberal construction, appeared to construe it against the very person for
whose benefit it was enacted.
The test of "reasonable prospect of employment" is a legalistic attempt to solve
a social problem and, as such, is legally and economically impractical. In a highly
complex industrial society it is difficult to determine with any appreciable degree of
accuracy whether or not there is a "reasonable prospect of employment." The test
applied in the principal case is not only so indefinite and uncertain as to make its
uniform application extremely difficult, but also tends to defeat the purpose for
which unemployment legislation was enacted.

VETERANS'

SENIORITY-CONFLICT WITH COLLECTIVE BARGAINNG

AGREEMENT.-

A veteran returned from service to his former position, where, during his absence,
a new contract had been negotiated between his employer and the union which was
the authorized bargaining agent for employees in that plant. Under the terms of
the new agreement, the seniority provisions which formerly existed were modified
so that certain union officials were now entitled to higher seniority than anyone
else, regardless of actual seniority. A lay-off occurred and union officials who, under
the contract, were accorded seniority superior to the veteran, but who, in point of
service were actually junior to him, were given preference over the veteran. The
veteran claimed that this was a violation of the rights guaranteed him under the
Selective Training and Service Act of 1940. Held, one judge dissenting, the lay-off
of the veteran was justified, as the courts should uphold the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. Gauweiler v. Elastic Stop Nut Corp., 162 F. 2d 448
(C. C. A. 3d 1947).
There are two separate provisions in the Selective Training and Service Act' which
are of immediate concern in this problem. Under Section 308(b)(B) 2 the Act provides that if a veteran had left his job to enter service, then upon his return, his
employer "shall restore such person to such position or to a position of like seniority, status and pay unless the employer's circumstances have so changed as to make
it impossible or unreasonable to do so. . .
23.
24.
N. Y.
25.

."

Under Section 308(c)a the Act pro-

Bliley Elec. Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 45 A. 2d 898, 904 (Pa. 1946).
Glenn Falls Portland Cement Co. v. Van Wirt Const. Co., 132 Misc. 95, 103, 228
Supp. 289, 299 (Sup. Ct. 1928).
See note 21 supra.

1. 54 STAT. 890, 50 U. S. C. § 308 (1940), as amended, 60 STAT. 341 (1946), s0
U. S. C. A. § 308 (Supp. 1947).
2. Id. § 308.
3. Id. § 308 (c): "Any person who is restored to a position in accordance with the
provisions of paragraph . . . (B) of subsection (b) shall be considered as having been
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vides that any person so restored shall be considered as having been on leave of
absence during the period he was in service and shall receive all benefits he would
have received under the rules of the company existing at the time of his entry
into service as if he had been on an ordinary leave of absence or furlough from
active work.
As the minority opinion in the instant case points out, the "change in circumstances" clause in Section 8(b) does not apply to seniority but relates solely to
restoration of the position and it would appear that an interpretation of it to limit
restoration to "like seniority" is contrary to the intent and the wording of the Section. 4 It also must be remembered that the words "impossible or unreasonable to
do so" mean more than merely inconvenient or undesirable.5
The right of the veteran to be restored to his position without loss of seniority
as guaranteed in Section 8(b) should not be limited by the other protective benefits given him by the Act. 6 This right is one which is independent of the rights
guaranteed in Section 8(c) relating to participation in insurance and other benefits
which he would have received pursuant to established practices relating to employees on furlough or leave of absence in effect when the person was inducted into
the armed forces. 7 Section 8(c), therefore, cannot be interpreted as cutting down
the restoration section of 8(b) so as to have it read "restoration to such position
or to a position of like seniority as he would have been restored to had he been
on an ordinary leave of absence from his plant." So to interpret it would unquestionably bind the veteran by collective bargaining provisions which were made while
he was on such "leave of absence." It would not, however, be giving the statute
the liberal construction in favor of the veteran which the courts have consistently
emphasized in the past.8
A collective bargaining agreement is an agreement between an employer and a
labor union which regulates the terms and conditions of employment. By this agreement an employee obtains rights which he can enforce individually against the employer. He obtains these rights under one of two theories. Either the union is
acting as the employee's agent or the employee is a third party beneficiary of the
agreement. 9 Only under the former, it would seem, could the union or employer
hold the individual employee obligated to perform the conditions so laid down
on furlough or leave of absence during his period of training and service in the land or
naval forces, shall be so restored without loss of seniority, shall be entitled to participate in insurance or other benefits offered by the employer pursuant to established rules
and practices relating to employees on furlough or leave of absence in effect with the
employer at the time such person was inducted into such forces, and shall not be
discharged from such position without cause within one year after such restoration."
4. Market Co. v. Hoffman, 101 U. S.112, 115 (1879). "We are not at liberty to construe any statute so as to deny effect to any part of its language. It is a cardinal rule of
statutory construction that significance and effect shall, if possible, be accorded to every
word."
5. Kay v. General Cable Corp., 144 F. 2d 653 (C. C. A. 3d 1944).
6. Trailmobile Co. v. Whirls, 154 F. 2d 866 (C. C. A. 6th 1946).
7. Ibid.
8. Salter v. Becker Roofing Co., 65 F. Supp. 633, 635 (N. D. Ala. 1946). "These sections should be construed as liberally as possible, so that military service should entail
no greater setback in the private pursuit or career of returning soldier than is unavoidable."
9.

TELLER, LABOR DISPUTES AND COLLECTIvE BARGADINGT§ 154 (1940).
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by the agreement because a third party beneficiary is not considered bound by an
obligation created by someone else. Under the first theory it has been held that
recovery by an employee depends upon his showing either that he initially authorized the making of the contract or that he subsequently ratified the contract. 10
Conversely, it would seem that in order to hold a veteran subject to a collective
bargaining agreement made between the employer and a union, it should be shown
that he initially authorized the contract or that he later ratified it. It must be
held that his initial membership in the union was an implied authorization to obligate himself to all future bargaining agreements made by the union, or that his
return to work, after leaving service, was a ratification of the bargaining agreement
in question. Although many objections could be made to either of these two propositions, the majority opinion in the instant case, proceeds on the assumption that
the veteran is bound by the agreement unless he is protected by statute.
The problem presented by the principal case is one on which there is no federal
precedent squarely in point. The majority, however, in reaching their decision, rely
upon two previous federal decisions to aid them in determining the purpose and
effect of the Selective Training and Service Act. They are Fishgold v. Sullivan
Drydock & Repair Corp." and Trailmobile Co. v. lhirls.1 - With this aid the majority in the principal case reached the conclusion that the Act gives the veteran
protection, while away, to the same extent as if he had remained all the time at
his job, or had been on furlough or leave of absence for some personal reason. If
he had remained on the job or had been on personal leave of absence he would have
been subject to the collective bargaining agreement between the employer and the
union. The majority indicates that if this is so, then it logically follows that he
should be bound by it while away in service and after he has returned. The court
concludes that this result is the only practical one from the standpoint of both
plant operation and collective bargaining.
In the Fishgold case the Court decided that a returning veteran does not have
"super-seniority" and cannot displace a non-veteran who has more seniority than
himself, even when counting the veteran's service years towards his seniority status.
This decision is not to be questioned, but it should be remembered that when the
Court in the Fislhgold case states that the veteran is protected as "if he had been
continuously employed," and that he is not to be granted an "increase in seniority"
over what he would have had if he had never entered the armed forces, it is referring to the "super-seniority" which is the issue in that case. Moreover, the statement by that Court that "no practice of employers or agreements between employers and unions can cut down the service adjustment benefits which Congress has
secured the veteran under the act' 3 would seem to indicate that the Court in the
Fishgold case would not support a collective bargaining agreement which cuts into
the veteran's statutory seniority rights.
The Trailvobile Co. case presented a state of facts more in line with those of
the principal case but would seem to support the position taken by the minority in
the principal case. There the veteran returned to his company which was controlled
by a parent corporation. The two companies were merged and a new collective
10. Gary v. Central of Ga. Ry., 44 Ga: App. 120, 160 S. E. 716 (1931).
Tz.z., op. dt. supra, note 9, § 167.
11.
12.
13.

328 U. S. 275 (1946).
154 F. 2d 866 (C. C. A. 6th 1946).
Fisbgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 328 U. S. 275, 285 (1946).

See also
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bargaining agreement drawn up whereby the seniority rights of the former employees
of the junior company were fixed as commencing the day of the merger. The distinction between that case and the principal case is that the veteran in the Trailmobile Co. case was being deprived of his seniority status as it existed at the time
he was inducted into the armed forces. The court there said that "The Act was
passed by Congress and approved by the President with full knowledge of the existence of the Labor Relations Act. This Act was not amended; but surely it should
not be presumed that Congress in failing to amend the Wagner Act, intended to
permit the concerted action of a collective bargaining agency and an employer to
destroy or whittle down the statutory right of the returning soldier."'1 4 Commenting
on the Fishgold decision in the Trailmobile Co. case, the court said that the veteran
was to be kept in the same position as if he had not gone to war but had remained
continuously employed, and that this "is an independent and additional right, not
to be impaired by the other protective benefits accorded him by statute" and one
which was not to cease when the first year of employment ends. 10 And again this
statement: "Collective bargaining agreements entered into pursuant to the terms of
the Wagner Act must recognize the statutory right of the veteran to the seniority
granted him by the selective service statute"' 6 would seem to be more than sufficient
to indicate that this court is also opposed to placing collective bargaining agreements above the statutory seniority granted to the veteran.
Both the principal case and Payne v. Wright Aeronautical Corp.,17 decided the
same day by the same court, seem to indicate that one of the main reasons for the
decisions is "the utter impracticability of enforcing in the same plant two conflicting systems of seniority. ' u s The Payne decision stated that it would be an impossible task for the employer to attempt to carry out his collective bargaining agreement and also give the veteran the seniority which the minority opinion in the
instant case feels is due him under the Act. As pointed out in the minority opinion
of the Payne case, however, even if the "employer does find himself in a dilemma,
it is because he has attempted to do that which he had no right to do, namely,
to enter into an agreement which disregards the statutory rights of the veteran, and
in his absence."' 9 Certainly the veteran should not be penalized for the employer's
disregard of rights existing under the Training and Service Act. Both the union
and the employer knew of the Act when they made their agreement and, therefore,
such agreement, must necessarily be read "in the light of such existing law." 2 0o Moreover, it is not really the impossible task that the majority opinion suggests. The
non-veteran, by his active participation in the collective bargaining agreement, has
certainly waived his seniority rights to the union officials and has no cause of cornplant if he is now replaced by an official. The veteran, on the other hand, should
not be said to have waived his rights to his statutory seniority by his initial membership in the union, nor by the mere fact of his return to his old position after
the completion of his term of active service in the armed forces. 2 ' The only just solu14. Trailmobile Co. v. Whirls, 154 F. 2d 866, 869 (C. C. A. 6th 1946).
15. Id. at 870.
16. Ibid.
17.

162 F. 2d 549 (C. C. A. 3d 1947).

18.
19.
20.
21.

Id. at 551.
162 F. 2d 549, 553 (C. C. A. 3d 1947).
Ibid.
In Niemiec v. Seattle Rainier Baseball Club, 67 F. Supp. 705 (N. D. Wash. 1946),
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tion would seem to be to allow the veterans at all times to hold their statutory positions of seniority while, at the same time, non-veterans yield their respective positions
in accordance with the agreement which they have presumably endorsed.
The purpose of the Selective Training and Service Act was to bolster and sustain the morale of our troops while in service. By promising them the security of
returning to their former positions without loss of seniority Congress succeeded in
its intent to alleviate partially the serviceman's apprehension concerning problems
he would have to face on his return home. And as the circuit court said in Grubbs
v. Ingalle Iron Works Co.:22 "The considerations, which impelled the Congress to
act, likewise require a liberal construction of this legislation. It is not the proper
function of courts to emasculate the provisions of remedial legislation because of
difficulty in recalling an intent inspired by the urgency of a national emergency." 2 3

a returning baseball player did not waive his right to be continued in employment for one
year by signing a contract which gave the club the right to terminate the contract by
giving official notice of release to player. The court said (at 709): "It is a rule of
law that when someone is held to having waived his legal rights that the waiver must be
dearly established."
22. 66 F. Supp. 550 (N. D. Ala. 1946).
23. Id. at 554.

